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 ABSTRACT  
 
The Wireless Applications Service Providers Association (WASPA) is a self-
regulatory body for the wireless application industry in South Africa – and 
employs its Code of Conduct as the primary instrument in regulating the industry. 
The purpose of this qualitative study is to evaluate how effective the Code has 
been in regulating the behaviour of the wireless applications service providers in 
the country. The findings from the research study suggest that the WASPA Code 
has more weaknesses than strengths. A significant finding is that WASPA is 
viewed as a legitimate regulator of the WASP industry – and its Code enjoys 
wide support from the industry. However, there are some questions around the 
organisation and the Code‟s credibility in a number of important areas. Some of 
the more important negative findings include, amongst others, the following: 
WASPA might have been captured by the established players in the industry; the 
WASPA Code seems to have insufficient focus on business-to-business 
aggregators; and the WASPA regulatory regime must cover the network 
operators‟ VAS services in order to ensure more meaningful industry coverage.  
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1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE WASP INDUSTRY 
1.1 Overview of the WASP Industry 
 
The evolution of mobile telecommunications business, from the erstwhile second-
generation to the more recent third-generation networks and compatible 
handsets, has led to the emergence of new category of wireless applications for 
mobile phone users (Goggin, 2008, p. 141). The companies that provide these 
wireless applications have various names across the different markets in the 
world. In South Africa, these companies are referred to as Wireless Applications 
Service Providers, or more commonly WASPs. Similarly, the industry is referred 
to as the WASP industry. In the United Kingdom (UK) the wireless applications 
services are referred to as “premium rate” services. According to the UK 
communication regulator, Ofcom, these services “are a form of micro-payment 
paid for content, data services and value added services that are subsequently 
charged to your telephone bill” (Ofcom, n.d.).  
 
1.1.1 Products and Services 
WASPs “provide mobile applications and content” (MyBroadband, 2008). Mobile 
content is defined as “value-added services (VAS) that provide entertainment, 
information or a combination of the two” and mobile services are “systems 
designed to deliver mobile content to mobile phone users” (Pandey, Clarck-
Dickson, & Moss, 2009, p. 19). Mobile content is expressed across numerous 
content areas – e.g. music, sports, games, news – and also include “repackaged 
formats of existing media such as television, radio or Internet” (Pandey, et al, 
2009, p. 19). 
 
Table 1 below outlines the mobile content and services categories. The mobile 
content market, and the services that deliver the said content, can be divided into 
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a number of categories – including, amongst others, mobile entertainment, 
mobile messaging, and mobile banking services (Pandey, et al, 2009, p. 20).  
 
 
Table 1: Categories of Mobile Content and Services 
Category  Example/ Description 
Mobile messaging SMS, MMS, e-mail, and Instant Messaging  
Mobile entertainment 
Mobile music, games, images, TV and video, gambling, and mobile adult 
and user-generated content (UGC) 
Mobile payments, 
banking and financial 
services 
Mobile banking, local and remote mobile payments, and domestic and 
international funds transfer 
Location Based 
Services 
Personal navigation, point of interest (POI), friend finder and family 
tracker services 
Mobile Internet Wireless data access using mobile phones  
Mobile social 
networking 
Chat rooms, User Generated Content sharing communities, etc 
Mobile advertising  SMS and MMS adverts, mobile web banners and posters, etc 
Source: (Pandey, et al, 2009, p. 20-21) 
 
 
For ease of analysis, one can segment the companies that provide these mobile 
applications into two main groupings – those who sell products and services 
directly to the public and those who sell to corporate clients. On the one hand the 
business-to-consumer players largely sell content and related services to 
members of the public. As per Table 1 earlier, content entertainment services 
include, amongst others things, mobile music, games and images (Pandey, et al, 
2009, p. 20). On the other hand, the business-to-business players largely sell 
mobile services used to deliver content – and only communicate to the general 
public on behalf of their clients. As per Table 1 earlier, mobile services include, 
amongst others things, mobile messaging and mobile banking (Pandey, et al, 
2009, p. 20). 
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1.1.2 Collaboration with Mobile Network Operators 
Wireless Applications Service Providers collaborate with mobile network 
operators to provide their services to the market. In business-to-consumer 
services, the WASP is responsible for sourcing and marketing the services, and 
buys the use of the mobile network operators‟ infrastructure and billing 
relationship with the end-consumer to deliver and bill for these services. For 
example, On Demand Group runs a television streaming service called TV: On 
Demand, which they have editorial control over and market to end-users (On 
Demand Group, 2010). Vodacom subscribers are able to access the TV: On 
Demand service via the Vodacom 3G network (Dingle, 2010) and are billed for 
this access through a Vodacom billing engine. If one accepts Melody‟s definition 
of interconnection occurring where one party connects equipment not belonging 
to an operator to the end of its network (1997, p. 53), then the collaboration 
between the WASP and the mobile network operator can be seen as a form of 
interconnection. 
 
Table 2 represents how the various participants in the mobile content value-chain 
are positioned – and what their role is. Mobile network operators are an important 
player in the delivery and retail environments (Pandey, et al, 2009, p. 4). 
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Table 2: Content Value Chain and Player Positioning: Emerging Markets 
Role  Participant  Example  
Content origination: 
The creation or 
commissioning of 
original content and 
applications 
Content producers 
Media companies, publishers, 
broadcasters, film studios 
Application 
developers  
Mobile software and 
application developers 
Content provisioning: 
Sourcing, enabling and 
enhancing content and 
applications 
Aggregators  Specialist mobile aggregators 
Enablers (technology) 
Service delivery platform 
vendors, online service 
providers (incl. social 
networks), device platform 
vendors 
Content distribution: 
Delivery of content and 
applications via 
networks and devices 
Delivery networks 
Mobile networks, WiFi 
providers 
Devices Mobile phones 
Retailers  
WASPs, mobile operator 
portals 
Source: Adapted from Dodardziev, Zoller & Mackenzie, 2010, p. 4. 
 
 
1.1.3 Strategic Role of Content Revenue  
The monthly average revenue per user (ARPU) features prominently in the South 
African mobile network operator‟s annual reports (Vodacom, 2003; Vodacom, 
2009). This suggests that the operators see ARPU as one of the key 
measurements of performance.  
 
Overall ARPU for mobile network operators around the world has been in decline 
over the last few years (Kemp, 2010, p. 8). According to MTN Group President 
and CEO, Phuthuma Nhleko “ARPUs typically drop as more people at the lower 
end of the income spectrum are able to own a mobile” (MTN Group, 2010). 
Dodardziev, et al (2010, p.3) agree with this view, and also attribute the drop in 
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voice ARPU “to lower-quality, lower-spending net additions”. In addition, the role 
of growing competition in the sector, “which has led to reduced voice tariffs” is 
also acknowledged for contributing to declining ARPU (Dodardziev, et al, 2010, 
p. 3). To illustrate this decline, Vodacom‟s overall ARPU per month decreased 
from R266 in 2000 (Vodacom, 2003, p. 6) to R133 in 2009 (Vodacom, 2009) – 
representing a fifty percent decline. However, it must be noted that there is little 
evidence to suggest that Vodacom‟s tariffs for voice services – and other 
operators‟ generally – have dropped correspondingly over the same period. As a 
result, there may be other reasons for declining voice ARPU – e.g. changing user 
behaviour. One way to determine the reasons for this decline would be through 
access to user behaviour data, over time, on a number of active SIM cards.  
 
As a result of declining voice ARPU, growing non-voice revenue has become 
imperative (Dodardziev, et al, 2010, p. 3). To this end, data revenue provides an 
invaluable opportunity for network operators to compensate for declining voice 
ARPU. In 2009 Vodacom South Africa‟s data services contributed approximately 
twelve percent to overall revenue (Vodacom, 2009). In 2010, mobile data 
represented in the region of twenty-five percent of total ARPU for many operators 
in developed markets (Kemp, 2010). This suggests that there is potential for 
growth of data services in South Africa. 
 
Data services – including WASP services – provide consumers with additional 
value, and therefore provide mobile network operators with additional income – 
over and above voice revenue. Overall WASP market-size and market-share 
figures are difficult to access, as the network operators do not commonly make 
this information public. However, the overall market is estimated to have 
generated over a billion rands in revenue in 2006 (Perlman, 2006, p. 3). 
According to documentation submitted by Vodacom and Cointel to the 
Competition Tribunal, during its 2005 consideration of the merger between the 
two firms, forty-nine percent of Vodacom WASP revenue came from the top five 
providers: iTouch, Exactmobile, First National Bank, Cointel and Foneworx. The 
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remaining fifty-one percent came from a multitude of smaller providers. It is 
highly probable that these ratios would be duplicated in relation to MTN and Cell 
C (Manoim, 2006, p. 2).  
 
1.2 Challenges in the Industry 
1.2.1 Consumer Distrust 
Wireless applications have become a ubiquitous part of everyday life and as a 
result the industry has attracted an abundance of service providers – and these 
have come with varying service standards and business ethics. The main 
challenge faced by the wireless applications industry in South Africa relates to 
the abuse of consumers, primarily through lack of transparency around services 
and the pricing thereof – where consumers would typically be unsure of how 
much money they are paying, and for what service. An example of one such 
practice is “subscribing consumers to premium-rated services without their 
knowledge” (McCleod, 2006). A scan of numerous media reports suggest that 
other common issues relate to minors accessing adult services, competitions and 
spam1. 
 
Further, media reports – particularly from the technology-specialist sites like, 
amongst others, MyBroadband (McCleod, 2006; MyBroadband, 2008) – suggest 
that WASP conduct has historically generated considerable public resentment. 
These business practices have been linked to increased churn amongst prepaid 
consumers “who, instead of trying to unsubscribe to a service they don‟t want, 
simply discard their SIM cards and switch networks” (McCleod, 2006). The 
challenge with such “rogue conduct” is the development of an atmosphere of 
consumer distrust – which can harm society in several ways. Firstly, “rogue 
conduct” by one group of service providers may result in consumers questioning 
the integrity of an entire industry (Muris, 2002, p. 5). Secondly, this distrust may 
                                            
1
 Unsolicited marketing communication sent to consumer‟s handset 
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well result in some consumers going without products whose purchase would 
improve their well-being (Muris, 2002, p. 5).  
 
1.2.2 Industry Response to its Challenges 
1.2.2.1 Self-Regulation 
The Wireless Application Services Providers Association (WASPA) is a self-
regulatory regime for the industry – and its response to the challenge of 
rebuilding consumer trust. According to WASPA Chairman, Leon Perlman, 
WASPA‟s central objective is “protecting consumers from rogue services that 
negatively impact consumer confidence and the industry,” (Rasool, 2010). 
WASPA employs a Code of Conduct as the central tool to regulate the industry.  
 
The self-regulatory regime was formed – on 26 August 2004 – primarily for the 
purpose of recognition as an Industry Representative Body (IRB) for companies 
providing wireless application services in South Africa (WASPA, 2004, p. 1). 
IRBs are responsible for, amongst other things, self-regulation of their respective 
industries through the use of codes of conduct – and the basis for WASPA‟s 
recognition as an IRB finds legal force in the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act of 2002 (RSA, 2002, Section 71). The Act was passed with the 
objective of, amongst others, promoting electronic forms of contracting and 
providing the basis for consumer protection in electronic transactions – across 
the various technology platforms (WASPA, 2004, p. 1). An organisation qualifies 
for this recognition as an IRB, by the Minister of Communications, if:  
 
… its members are subject to a code of conduct; membership is subject 
to adequate criteria; the code of conduct requires continued adherence to 
adequate standards of conduct; and the representative body is capable of 
monitoring and enforcing its code of conduct adequately. (RSA, 2002, 
Section 71) 
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WASPA has a hybrid operational model that includes, on one hand self-
regulation, and on the other industry promotion (Perlman, 2006). The 
organisation has numerous sub-committees that oversee the execution of 
various functions. The Management Committee, or ManCom, controls the overall 
organisation and is responsible for, amongst other things, forming and dissolving 
other committees and expelling members who contravene the Code (WASPA, 
2008). The seven-member ManCom is elected annually by the WASPA 
membership at the association‟s annual general meeting (WASPA, 2008). The 
Network Operators Liaison Committee, or NetCom, interacts with the mobile 
network operators on new product development, revenue models and technical 
issues (WASPA, 2008). The Code of Conduct Committee, or CodeCom, 
oversees the development and implementation of the Code (WASPA, 2008). The 
Secretariat facilitates the processing of complaints relating to the Code, and the 
Media Monitor proactively monitors and tests WASP services for compliance – or 
lack thereof (WASPA, 2009). The eight Adjudicators, are “specialist Information 
Communications Technology (ICT) lawyers”, and rule on formal complaints 
(MyBroadband, 2008). The Appeals Panel is the apex adjudication body 
(Perlamn, 2008). 
 
1.2.2.2 The Code of Conduct 
The WASPA Code of Conduct was passed on 30 June 2005 at the WASPA 
Annual General Meeting, and has been in force since 01 September 2005. The 
Code focuses broadly on consumer protection matters, with advertising 
standards as an important sub-segment – and was developed “in an effort to 
minimise abusive trade practices” (McCleod, 2006). The WASPA Code “covers 
issues such as spam (unsolicited commercial communications), subscription 
services, advertising and pricing, competitions, complaint resolution, and adult 
services” (MyBroadband, 2008, November 10). With regard to consumer 
protection, WASPA states that:  
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The primary objective of the WASPA Code of Conduct is to ensure that 
members of the public can use mobile services with confidence, assured 
that they will be provided with accurate information about all services and 
the pricing associated with those services. The Code aims to equip 
customers and consumers with a mechanism for addressing any 
concerns or complaints relating to services provided by WASPA 
members, and a framework for impartial, fair and consistent evaluation 
and response to any complaints made. (WASPA, 2010, Section 1.2)  
 
The consumer protection objectives are therefore mainly two-fold. Firstly, the 
intention is to bolster consumer confidence in WASP services – with particular 
emphasis on how pricing is communicated in advertising. Secondly, there is an 
intention to provide a fair complaint resolution mechanism. An example of the 
consumer protection measures WASPA has introduced recently is the 
requirement for WASPs to send monthly subscription reminder messages to their 
consumers. The reminder “gives customers more clear and explicit information 
about the services they subscribe to, the inclusive costs of the services, who the 
service provider is and how to unsubscribe from the service” (MyBroadband, 
2008). Another example is the specifications for television advertisements. The 
organisation prescribes a uniform layout for all WASP television adverts, which 
requires that all compulsory information is “present and is easy to read on 
televisions of all sizes” – including “total pricing and type of service” 
(MyBroadband, 2008). Both examples mentioned above are particularly 
important in an industry that has historically battled with lack of transparency 
around the pricing for its services.  
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1.3 Problem Statement 
1.3.1 Doubt Over Effectiveness of Industry Response 
The research problem is that it is unclear whether the WASPA self-regulatory 
regime has been successful. It is not apparent whether its Code of Conduct has 
been effective in regulating the behaviour of the WASPs in the country. 
 
There is a suggestion that “the rules are generally not enforced” (MyBroadband, 
2008). In other words, it seems that the organisation is struggling to implement 
the Code and assert itself on its members who contravene the Code. The 
implication is that the threat of possible punitive action for contravening the Code 
might not be seen as an effective deterrent as it is “it is very uncommon for a 
WASP to lose their license or contract because of it” (Muller, 2008). Further, “the 
protection of consumers is reactive rather than pro-active” where these Code-
contravening WASPs are only punished in the event of a successful complaint 
(MyBroadband, 2008). The implication is that these WASPs are able to get away 
with contravening the Code in the majority of instances.  
 
1.4 Purpose Statement 
1.4.1 Evaluating the Effectiveness of Industry Response 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate how effective the WASPA Code has 
been in regulating the behaviour of the Wireless Applications Service Providers 
(WASPs) in South Africa. 
 
1.5 Summary 
 
 As discussed earlier, the omnipresent use of wireless applications in the market 
has attracted the industry to a large number of service providers – with varying 
service levels and business ethics. WASPA‟s role is to hold the industry to a 
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common high standard and thereby restore confidence in the industry‟s products 
and services. The research problem is that it is uncertain whether its efforts have 
been successful. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of its 
Code of Conduct in regulating the behaviour of the WASPs in the country. 
 
The research report is structured as follows. The next chapter is a review of the 
pertinent literature – and explores the main themes in evaluating self-regulation 
and Codes of Conduct. The third chapter is a discussion of the research question 
and the methodology adopted. The fourth chapter is a presentation of the 
research results. This is followed, in the fifth chapter, by an analysis of the said 
results. Finally, chapter six presents the conclusions and puts forward some 
recommendations. 
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2. CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON SELF REGULATION 
 
This chapter is a review of the pertinent literature relating to the research 
question. Firstly, it looks at theories of regulation with a specific focus on 
responding to market failure and consumer protection. Secondly, it analyses the 
regulatory continuum – from no regulation to statutory regulation – and locates 
the discussion on self-regulation within this context. Thirdly, it discusses the code 
of conduct as a central tool for any self-regulation regime. Lastly, it looks at the 
analytical framework to be employed in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
WASPA Code of Conduct.  
 
2.1. Theories of Regulation 
2.1.1. Devolution of Power 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the supreme law of the 
country (White, 2004, p. 5201). It forms the foundation for a society based on 
democratic values and safeguards these democratic values through the 
“separation of powers” principle which divides the functions of the state between 
three interdependent arms – the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary 
(Mokgoro, 2002). The legislative body controls the public fiscus and creates laws 
that are universally binding; the executive then applies and gives effect to these 
laws; the judiciary intervenes to resolve complex disputes that may arise from the 
creation and application of these laws – i.e. between the legislature and the 
executive on the one hand, and between them and members of society on the 
other (Mokgoro, 2002).  
 
As the ultimate “majoritarian” political forum in the country, the legislature has 
oversight functions over the implementation of the law (Venter, 2001, p. 21). In 
order to aid in the implementation of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act of 2002, the legislature has devolved regulatory powers to 
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WASPA, a self-regulatory “non-majoritarian” institution. WASPA was formed 
primarily for the purpose of recognition as an Industry Representative Body, or 
IRB, for companies providing wireless application services in South Africa as per 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (WASPA, 2004, p. 1).  
 
2.1.2. Economic and Social Regulation 
Melody argues that regulation is introduced as a response to two main objectives 
– economic and social (1997, p. 13). This distinction made between “economic” 
and “social” regulation is echoed by Price and Verhulst (1999, p. 8). “From an 
economic perspective the services should satisfy the full range of consumer 
demand and be supplied under conditions of optimal efficiency,” Melody says 
(1997, p. 13). The effort of achieving “optimal efficiency” finds expression in 
policies related to stimulating competition in the marketplace. “From a social 
perspective, the service should be made available to everyone on reasonable 
terms, whether or not it is profitable to do so,” he adds (Melody, 1997, p. 13). The 
effort of making the service “available to everyone” finds expression in policies 
related to universal access. Self-regulation, as per the discussion later in 2.2, is 
one of various options available to regulate markets – in order to achieve the 
above-mentioned economic and social objectives. The other options are statutory 
regulation, co-regulation and no regulation. Within this context, it is important to 
consider the effectiveness of the self-regulation option in achieving competition 
and universal access in the WASP industry. 
 
The central role of telecoms policy is to develop a competitive environment 
(Samarajiva & Melody, 2000, p. 29). A liberalised, competitive environment has 
numerous benefits: it encourages innovation, widens the choices available to 
consumers, improves quality of service, and lowers overall prices (Samarajiva & 
Melody, 2000, p. 29). The evidence of most of these benefits is especially 
conspicuous in the OECD countries – with lower prices, increased subscribers, 
and diversified range of services resulting from the introduction of competition in 
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the market (Esselaar, Gillwald, & Stork, 2006). In order to create the desired 
competitive environment, regulators must curb the market power of any one firm.  
To this end, it is therefore invaluable for regulators to interrogate the structure of 
the market to determine which firm holds “significant market power” within it 
(Samarajiva & Melody, 2000, p. 30). In many instances where two network 
operators being interconnected have different levels of market power, the larger 
operator with “significant market power” has no motivation to interconnect with 
the smaller competitor – and may either reject interconnection or attempt to 
impose unfavorable terms (Melody, 1997, p. 51). A regulator would cancel out 
such inequalities in the marketplace, and prevent the abuse of “significant market 
power”, by requiring such operators with interconnect with all competitive 
operators (Samarajiva & Melody, 2000, p. 30).  
 
From a social perspective, effective policy and regulation ensures the network‟s 
optimum functioning, and the inclusion of those excluded (Falconer & Neilson, 
2007, p. 20). The network knowledge economy excludes those it deems 
incapable of contributing to its development – i.e. those insufficiently productive 
and competitive. It only includes those who contribute as consumers and 
producers of products traded within the network. The gulf between the two 
groups has led to numerous global trends of social underdevelopment that policy 
formulation and regulation should address – inequality, polarization, poverty and 
misery (Castells, 1999, p. 7). The inequality and polarization trends are 
conceptually similar – and only differ in severity. Inequality refers to the uneven 
distribution of wealth, i.e. income and assets, amongst individuals or socio-
economic institutions (Castells, 1999, p. 7). Polarization, or extreme inequality, 
refers to when both the high- and low-end of a wealth distribution scale swell at a 
rate faster than that of the centre (Castells, 1999, p. 7). Similarly, the poverty and 
misery trends are conceptually similar – differing only in severity (Castells, 1999, 
p. 7). Poverty refers to a standard set by a society to determine the level of 
income essential to have an accepted material quality of life (Castells, 1999, p. 
7). Misery, or extreme poverty, refers to the determination of the lowest material 
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quality of life that threatens the existence of life itself (Castells, 1999, p. 7). 
Including the excluded should be achieved through various means that result 
from a pro-competition environment: improving services in and lowering the cost 
of providing and consumption of telecoms products (Falconer & Neilson, 2007, p. 
20). 
 
2.1.3. Justifications for Regulation 
Baldwin and Cave provide a number of examples that justify the need for 
regulation – including, amongst others, “information inadequacies, distribution 
justice and social policy, externalities, monopolies and natural monopolies” 
(1999, p. 17). They argue that an industry can use a combination of these 
justifications on which to base their case for regulation. Two justifications that 
may relate to the wireless applications industry in South Africa include the 
“information inadequacies” and the “distribution of justice and social policy”.  
 
In the “information inadequacies” justification, the regulatory effort aims to help 
consumers make informed purchase decisions by “making information more 
extensively accessible, accurate, and affordable” consumers (Baldwin & Cave, 
1999, p. 12). A related instance of “market failure” in the WASP context relates to 
the lack of transparency around the pricing of WASP services – where 
consumers would typically be unsure of how much money they are paying, and 
for what service. In response to this WASPA requires WASPs to send monthly 
subscription reminder messages to their consumers. The “reminder must follow a 
format and style specified by WASPA that gives customers more clear and 
explicit information about the services they subscribe to, the inclusive costs of the 
services, who the service provider is and how to unsubscribe from the service” 
(MyBroadband, 2008). The following is an example of one of the reminder 
message format prescribed:  
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You are subscribed to [name of service provider] [content/service 
description]. Cost [cost of service and frequency of billing]. For help, SMS 
HELP [optional keyword] to [short code] or call [call centre number + 
“(VAS)” if applicable]. To unsubscribe, SMS STOP [service keyword] to 
[short code]. (WASPA, 2010, Section 11.5.2) 
 
In the “distribution of justice and social policy” justification, the regulatory effort 
aims to “further social policies” of the government (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 15). 
A related instance of “market failure” in the WASP context relates to children 
accessing adult content or being exposed to the marketing of adult content. 
Section 8 of the WASPA Code responds to this by limiting children‟s access to 
both adult content and its marketing messages by requiring members to  “take 
reasonable steps to ensure that only persons of 18 years of age or older have 
access to adult content services. Explicit confirmation of a user‟s age must be 
obtained prior to the delivery of an adult content service” (WASPA, 2010, Section 
8.1.3). Further, the Code requires that “promotions for adult services must not 
appear in publications or other media specifically targeted at children” (WASPA, 
2010, Section 8.2.2). 
 
2.1.4. Consumer Protection  
According to Harker, regulation is employed to control the “conduct and 
behaviour” of businesses (Harker, 2000, p. 199). This need to control businesses 
stems largely from “market failure” or “an inefficient or inequitable market 
practice” (Posner, 1974, p. 336) – where “the uncontrolled market place will, for 
some reason, fail to produce behaviour or results in accordance with the public 
interest” (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 9).  The “market failure” in the wireless 
applications industry in South Africa relates to the development of an atmosphere 
of consumer distrust – which may result in consumers questioning the integrity of 
an entire industry or some consumers going without products whose purchase 
would improve their well-being (Muris, 2002, p. 5).  
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Consumer protection is a recurring theme within academic discussions on 
regulation (Price & Verhulst, 1999; Harker & Harker, 2000; Muris, 2002; 
Purchase, 2004). It is essentially about achieving two complementary objectives: 
ensuring that consumers are able to make well-informed purchase decisions; and 
that the providers of services fulfill the promises they make to consumers about 
their offering (Muris, 2002, p. 4). Individual consumer transactions are 
characterised by asymmetry in information and bargaining power between the 
providers of services and the consumers thereof. This imbalance is of particular 
concern in South Africa for numerous reasons: the majority of consumers are 
poor; many have low levels of literacy; and many reside in rural areas with limited 
access to complaints-resolution assistance (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2004, p. 11). Service providers abuse this asymmetry in access to information 
“when misleading, deceptive or offensive information is communicated to the 
marketplace” (Harker & Harker, 2000, p. 156). 
 
Consumer protection in South Africa is governed by various pieces of legislation. 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act of 1996 is the supreme law 
of the country, and its Bill of Rights enshrines the fundamental rights of all 
citizens (RSA, 1996, Section 7.1). The Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act of 2002 is a sector-specific law. It promotes electronic forms of 
contracting and provides the basis for consumer protection in electronic 
transactions (RSA, 2002, Section 1.2). The Consumer Protection Act of 2008, 
which is not yet in force, is intended to provide South Africa with an overarching 
consumer protection regime – in order to create a consistent legislative and 
enforcement framework for consumer transactions and agreements (Department 
of Trade and Industry, 2004, p. 4). The Act is expected to be in force in 2011 
(Media Update, 2011).   
 
The WASPA Code of Conduct focuses broadly on consumer protection matters, 
with advertising standards as an important sub-segment. The Code aims to 
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protect consumers by enabling them to “use mobile services with confidence, 
assured that they will be provided with accurate information about all services 
and the pricing associated with those services” and to providing them with 
access to redress through a framework that provides an “impartial, fair and 
consistent evaluation and response to any complaints made” (WASPA, 2010, 
Section 1.2). It “covers issues such as spam (unsolicited commercial 
communications), subscription services, advertising and pricing, competitions, 
complaint resolution, and adult services” (MyBroadband, 2008).  
 
2.2. The Regulation Continuum  
 
Table 3 overleaf is a graphic represents the numerous options in carrying out 
market regulation – with each requiring varying degrees of responsibilities 
between the state and the regulated organizations within a given industry. Self-
regulation, which occurs when a group of companies exerts control over its own 
membership and their conduct, can be described as a point on a spectrum or 
continuum between no regulation and classic statutory regulation (Bartle & Vass, 
2005, p. 1). The notion of no regulation lies on the one end of the continuum – 
with no explicit controls on the organisations that operate within it. The notion of 
statutory regulation lies on the other end of the continuum – with regulation 
specified, administered and enforced by the state. The notions of self-regulation 
and co-regulation lie between the two poles.  
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Table 3: Regulation Continuum 
 
Statutory Regulation Co-Regulation Self-Regulation No Regulation 
 
Regulations are 
specified, 
administered and 
enforced by the state 
 
Regulations are 
specified, 
administered and 
enforced by a 
combination of the 
state and the 
regulated 
organization(s) 
 
 
Regulations are 
specified, 
administered and 
enforced by the 
regulated 
organization(s) 
 
No explicit controls on 
an organisation 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from 
Bartle and Vass, 2005, p. 1 
 
2.2.1. No Regulation 
There are no explicit controls on firms where regulation is absent. The market 
mechanism coordinates the allocation of scarce resources for the good of the 
individual and the collective – i.e. the public interest. For example, a well-
functioning competitive market offers a compelling incentive for providers of 
services to offer the most attractive range of price and quality options to 
consumers (Department of Trade and Industry, 2004, p. 15). In competitive 
markets, when consumers are not satisfied with the offering of one provider they 
can turn to others – and this ability to shift expenditure imposes a rigorous 
discipline on each provider to satisfy consumer needs (Muris, 2002, p. 4). 
Competition also motivates providers of services to communicate truthful and 
useful information about their offerings. This further drives them to fulfill promises 
made in respect of price, quality, and other terms of sale – as consumers can 
punish a provider‟s deceit or it‟s reneging on promises made by voting with their 
wallets (Muris, 2002, p. 4). Correspondingly, well informed consumers are seen 
to give an invaluable impetus for innovation in the marketplace, and are an 
important driver for competitiveness – by demanding competitive prices, 
improved product quality and better service (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2004, p. 4). 
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However, there are circumstances where the market allocation of resources is 
not optimal – imperfect competition, unbalanced market operation, missing 
markets and undesirable market results. Under these conditions, regulation is 
one of the methods employed to improve the efficiency in the said allocation (den 
Hertog, 1999, p. 225). 
 
2.2.2. Statutory Regulation 
In statutory regulation the State assumes the responsibility to specify, administer 
and enforce regulations. According to the public interest theory, statutory 
regulation is provided in response to the demand of the public for the correction 
of inefficient or inequitable market practices. The theory is premised on two 
assumptions – markets will not operate efficiently if left alone and government 
regulation operates effectively and without cost (Posner, 1974, p. 336). 
Importantly, the public interest theory puts particular emphasis on the credibility, 
impartiality and competence of State regulators in the pursuit of stated public 
interest objectives (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 19).  
 
However, there are numerous views that challenge the validity of the public 
interest theory (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 20). Firstly, the theory fails to 
acknowledge that regulation occurs within an environment of multiple and 
contradictory conceptions of the public interest. Secondly, there is doubt on the 
actual competence and efficiency that the theory attributes to regulators. 
Whereas self-regulation lowers the costs associated with accessing industry 
expertise, statutory regulation shows an increasing knowledge gap. When this 
gap leads to the interests of those being regulated being ignored it increases the 
probability of non-compliance (Schulz & Held, 2001, p. A-6). An important 
inadequacy of statutory regulation is that “government agencies may lack the 
information and technical competence necessary to make the best policy 
decisions” (Price & Verhulst, 1999, p. 13). In addition, whereas self-regulation is 
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more likely to resolve disputes informally, statutory regulation follows more 
formal, expensive and overly protracted legal processes (Webb, 2004, p. 3). 
Thirdly, the public interest theory understates the extent to which economic and 
political power influences regulation – where developments result from the 
contestation for power between the various groups within the market and 
between such groups and the State (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 21). The State‟s 
intervention in the market is therefore sculpted, not by its pursuit of the public 
good, but by its response to the competing policy demands of the various interest 
groups (Posner, 1974, p. 336). Regulation is then “captured” when it fails to act in 
the interest of the public good, and rather acts in the commercial interests of 
specific interest groups.  
 
2.2.3. Co-Regulation 
Co-regulation is “self-regulation with public oversight or ratified by the state, in 
other words it is self-regulation with a legal basis” (Latzer, Just, Saurwein, & 
Slominski, 2003, p. 135). In co-regulation the State and the regulated 
organisations together specify, administer and enforce regulations. Co-
regulation, as the policy-making process involving the widest range of industry 
players in the regulatory discourse, offers considerable scope for the wishes of 
all stakeholders to be taken into account, while also potentially offering better 
transparency in the application of the regulatory initiatives adopted than self-
regulation alone (Goggin, 2008, p. 142). A related concept is “Regulated Self-
Regulation”, introduced by German Constitutional Court judge, Wolfgang 
Hoffmann-Riem, to describe the evolving role of the State from hierarchical 
control to a modulation of processes going on within society (Schulz & Held, 
2001, p. A-1).  
 
There has been wide global support for the self-regulatory and co-regulatory 
approaches in the WASP industries in the developed world. There is no 
Government mandated or legislated mobile content regulatory scheme in the 
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United States. The industry association, Cable Telecommunications & Internet 
(CTIA), has been left to develop a self-regulatory scheme in this area through a 
code of practice (Goggin, 2008, p. 144). Office of Communications (Ofcom) is the 
communications industry‟s regulator in the United Kingdom (UK). Under the UK‟s 
Communication‟s Act 2003, Ofcom has the responsibility of regulating premium 
rate services in that country (PhonepayPlus, 2009, p. 4). PhonepayPlus acts, on 
Ofcom‟s behalf, as the regulatory agency for premium rate services in the UK 
(PhonepayPlus, 2009, p. 4). PhonepayPlus is therefore a co-regulatory scheme 
as its activities have a statutory basis through the UK Communications Act and 
enforced by the converged regulator Ofcom – which has the power to set 
conditions for service provision and the approval of a code regulating the 
premium rate services (Goggin, 2007, p. 147).  
 
2.2.4. Self-Regulation 
In self-regulation regulations are specified, administered and enforced by the 
regulated organisations – and is seen as “a voluntary restraint that firms are 
willing to impose on their own conduct” (Lee, 2003, p. 277). The advantages of 
self-regulation revolve mainly around two principles: expertise and efficiency 
(Baldwin & Cave, 1999, p. 27). Industry practitioners have more expertise and 
technical knowledge than public officials, and allow the regulatory effort to 
“overcome the problem of information deficits of state regulation” (Latzer, et al., 
2003, p. 142). Importantly, this lowers the costs associated with accessing this 
knowledge. As a result, it is easier to develop appropriate rules, and this 
increases the probability of the effectiveness of and compliance to the 
regulations (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 7). Further, self-regulation disputes are more 
efficiently settled – as they are more likely to be resolved informally avoiding the 
more onerous recourse to formal legal processes. In addition, from the state‟s 
perspective this route is more efficient as the regulatory costs are borne by the 
industry rather than the state (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 7).     
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Self-regulation has numerous disadvantages. Firstly, it may lead to collusion and 
other expressions of anti-competitive behaviour (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 8). 
Secondly, self-regulation is often seen as lacking in accountability as there is 
“insufficient participation of democratically elected parliaments” (Latzer, et al., 
2003, p. 146). Its processes have limited external participation and may lack the 
credibility associated with democratic political processes (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 
8). And finally, self-regulation might be accused of not being forceful enough – 
and therefore ineffective in achieving its objectives (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 8). 
Punishment for transgressions is “limited to reputation or organisational 
sanctions such as the withdrawal of already granted seals of approval, fines, 
public reprimands or expulsion of members” (Latzer, et al., 2003, p. 141). The 
self-regulatory body typically does not have the authority to “sanction 
existentially, by professional disbarment for example” (Latzer, et al., 2003, p. 
141). The sanctions could therefore potentially be inadequate.  
  
2.3. Evaluating Self-Regulation and Codes of Conduct  
 
As stated above, self-regulation can be described as a point on a continuum 
between no regulation and classic statutory regulation (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 
1). Codes of conduct, or voluntary codes, are an essential instrument for 
business self-regulation (Bondy, 2007, p. 1). Their raison d‟être is to control the 
behaviour of organisations participating in the said self-regulation regime (Webb, 
2004, p. 11).  
 
Significantly, commitments to codes of conduct are voluntary – i.e. the law does 
not require them. However, there still is a strong relationship between codes and 
the law. The law can have a negative or positive stimulus on codes. The law may 
have a negative stimulus when a particular industry institutes a self-regulatory 
scheme and code in response to the perceived threat of impending statutory 
regulation (Webb & Morrison, 2004, p. 101). The law may have a positive 
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stimulus when the State explicitly uses legislation to advance the use of codes of 
conduct in support of particular public policy objectives (Webb & Morrison, 2004, 
p. 101).  For example, in delegated self-regulation the State delegates the 
implementation of statutory duties to the self-regulatory body (Bartle and Vass, 
2005, p. 2). 
 
For any self-regulatory effort to be effective, the participating firms must comply 
with its code of conduct. The successful design and implementation of the code 
of conduct is key to the effectiveness of the self-regulation regime.  
 
2.3.1. Evaluation Approach 
A distinction is made between the acts of “monitoring” and “evaluation”. Kusek 
and Rist provide comprehensive and useful definitions for the two phenomena.  
 
They define monitoring as:  
 
a continuous function that uses the systematic collection of data on 
specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of 
an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of 
progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of 
allocated funds.(Kusek & Rist, 2004, p. 227)  
 
According to the definition provided above, one monitors an “ongoing 
development” based on pre-determined indicators. The act of monitoring is 
therefore not retrospective, but is concerned with the current and the future. The 
study into the effectiveness of the WASPA Code is a retrospective – looking at 
the period between 2006 and 2008. As a result, the act of “monitoring” – with the 
related activities of identifying the outcomes to monitor, selecting the key 
indicators for those outcomes and determining the baseline data on the 
indicators – is necessarily excluded from this study.  
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Kusek and Rist further define “evaluation” as: 
 
the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed 
project, programme or policy, its design, implementation and results. The 
aim is to determine the relevance and fulfillment of objectives, 
development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An 
evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling 
the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of 
both recipients and donors. (Kusek & Rist, 2004, p. 227) 
 
According to the definition provided above the act of “evaluation” can be 
retrospective. The “evaluation” methodology is therefore appropriate for the study 
into the effectiveness of the WASPA Code – as the study is a retrospective look 
at the period between 2006 and 2008.  
 
Regrettably, the literature review has uncovered limited academic discourse on 
frameworks to evaluate the effectiveness of codes of conduct. To circumvent this 
limitation, the researcher has referenced code-evaluation frameworks from a 
wider sphere than only academic discourse – including, amongst others, 
publications from government departments and regulatory bodies. However, 
discussions around the key recurring themes from these frameworks are 
bolstered by extensive reference to academic discourse. In other words, the 
evaluation framework is derived from industry sources, but the themes that 
collectively make up the framework are linked to discourse from established 
scholars. 
 
As mentioned above, there are numerous Code evaluation frameworks 
uncovered from the wider literature search (Industry Canada, 2002; 
PhonepayPlus, 2008; Price and Verhulst, 1999). Industry Canada‟s Office of 
Consumer Affairs has for some time been studying the use of voluntary codes in 
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Canada and elsewhere in the world and published extensively on the subject – 
with A Framework for Evaluating Voluntary Codes one such work (Industry 
Canada, 2002, p. 5). This publication has been a most useful reference in 
interrogating the broad principles relating to effective and ineffective codes. A 
Framework for Evaluating Voluntary Codes is structured around the four pillars of 
“relevance, cost effectiveness or alternatives, and due process” (Industry 
Canada, 2002, p. 11). PhonepayPlus – the regulatory agency for premium rate 
services in the United Kingdom – has identified five principles of good regulation: 
“transparency, accountability, proportionality, consistency and targeting” 
(PhonepayPlus, 2008, p. 10). Price and Verhulst argue that an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of any regulatory effort must take into consideration the various 
elements of the regulatory process, which include: “policy making, legislation, 
enforcement, and adjudication” (1999, p. 11).  
 
2.3.2. Adapted Code Evaluation Framework 
The framework used to evaluate the effectiveness of the WASPA Code is 
adapted from Industry Canada‟s A Framework for Evaluating Voluntary Codes. 
 
The Industry Canada framework is segmented into four pillars: “relevance, 
success, cost effectiveness or alternatives and due process” (Industry Canada, 
2002, p. 11). “Relevance” investigates issues such as “the need for a voluntary 
code or its objectives” (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 15). “Success” investigates 
issues such as “has the code achieved its objectives” (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 
16). “Alternative approaches” investigates issues such as “are the most 
appropriate and efficient means being used to achieve objectives, relative to 
other approaches to delivery” (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 20). “Due process” 
investigates issues such as “openness, transparency and fairness” (Industry 
Canada, 2002, p. 12). 
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Each of the four pillars – that make up the Industry Canada framework – is 
broken down into a number of “issues”. For example “relevance” is broken down 
into two issues – i.e. “Does the voluntary code address a fundamental problem or 
actual need” and “Are there competing codes or legislative instruments” (Industry 
Canada, 2002, p. 15). Each “issue” is further broken down into “performance 
indicators” which “provide guidelines for the questions that might be asked to 
determine whether due process is respected, whether the code is relevant or 
successful, or whether an alternative should be explored” (Industry Canada, 
2002, p. 11). 
 
Similar to the Industry Canada tool, the analytical framework to be employed for 
the evaluation of the WASPA Code is made up of five pillars – in this instance 
rephrased as themes. These themes are institutional positioning, code relevance, 
stakeholder participation, code enforcement and code impact. Again, the themes 
are broken down into a number of “issues”. The “institutional positioning” theme 
is new to the researcher‟s framework. However, the “issue” it uses – “is WASPA 
well established” is borrowed from the Industry Canada framework under the 
“success” pillar. The “code relevance” theme is borrowed directly from the 
Industry Canada framework. The “stakeholder participation” theme is also new to 
the researcher‟s framework. However, the “issues” it uses – “Has the WASPA 
code achieved wide coverage” and “Has the WASPA code development been 
open, transparent, fair and meaningful” are both borrowed from the Industry 
Canada framework under the “due process” and “success” pillars respectively. 
The “code enforcement” theme is also new to the researcher‟s framework. Again, 
the “issue” it uses – “is there a range of appropriate negative consequences and 
incentives for compliance” – is borrowed from the Industry Canada framework 
under the “due process” pillar. The “code impact” theme is similar to the 
“success” pillar from the Industry Canada framework – and has only been 
rephrased in the researcher‟s framework.  
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Table 4 below outlines the analytical framework used for the evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the WASPA Code of Conduct.  
 
Table 4: Analytical Framework for WASPA Code 
Theme  Issues  
Institutional 
Positioning  
 • Is WASPA well established?  
Code Relevance 
 • Does the voluntary code address a fundamental problem 
or an actual need?  
Stakeholder 
Participation  
 • Has the WASPA code achieved wide coverage?  
 • Has the WASPA code development been open, 
transparent, fair and meaningful?  
Code Enforcement 
 • Is there a range of appropriate negative consequences 
and incentives for compliance?  
Impact of the Code 
 • Have the objectives of the code been achieved? 
 • Are there unintended or negative effects of the code? 
   
2.3.2.1. Institutional Positioning 
“Institutional positioning” is a phrase used by the researcher to refer to themes 
from the literature that relate to the means and capability of the self-regulatory 
body to effectively carry out its responsibilities.  
 
According to Purchase, code effectiveness “is a function of both coverage and 
credibility” (2004, p. 83). “For example, if a code dealing with industry 
environmental or selling practices does not involve a large part of an industry, 
then it is unlikely to be judged a viable regulatory effort,” he says (Purchase, 
2004, p. 83).  As a result, participation in the self-regulatory effort should 
represent a considerable industry market share (Purchase, 2004, p. 83). 
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Price and Verhulst argue that an effective self-regulatory regime must be 
“impartial, independent” (1999, p. 37). The concepts of “impartiality” and 
“independence” are not only closely related, but also recurring themes 
throughout the literature. Harker also argues that an “independent code 
administrator” is necessary to receive and handle complaints (2000, p. 199). 
While the theme of independence can have various connotations, a useful 
interpretation is that offered by Melody, who interprets it to mean independence 
to “implement policy without undue interference from politicians or industry 
lobbyists” (Melody, 1997, p. 19). Independence from the industry is particularly 
important in ensuring that the Code has legitimacy. The opposite of 
independence is described as regulatory capture, where “the regulators are co-
opted by the regulatees and thus lose their legitimacy as regulators” (Sethi, 2005, 
p. 81).  
 
Price and Verhulst also argue that institutional capability depends on the self-
regulatory organisation being “equipped with the necessary powers to evaluate 
any complaint” (1999, p. 37). Being “equipped” is also a recurring theme – and 
has various connotations relating to institutional capability and capacity. Melody 
refers to the ability to “acquire specialised skills” as important to a regulator‟s 
effectiveness (1997, p. 19). Harker and Harker refer to the importance of 
adequate funding for a regulator to be effective (Harker and Harker, 2000, p. 
158). The availability of funding can be seen as a precondition for the ability to 
acquire the necessary skills for effective regulation. Importantly, this capacity 
also extends to the ability of the self-regulatory body to proactively monitor the 
activities of the code participants in the market – and generate its own 
complaints. Particularly in the case of advertising standards, a monitoring tool 
“covering advertising in all media should be in place in order to generate 
complaints about advertising which may be potentially unacceptable to society” 
(Harker, 2000, p. 199).  
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In addition, the “ability and willingness of the corporation to implement the code” 
is an important factor in the effectiveness of a code of conduct (Bondy, 2007, p. 
2). The willingness for individual service providers to implement the code is 
encouraged by, amongst others, the code having vocal champions where 
industry leaders “demonstrate a philosophical commitment to the common good” 
and “not merely defending entrenched industry interests” (Sethi, 2005, p. 82). 
The influence of opinion leaders is invaluable to providing credibility within the 
industry for the code and this support “may increase the possibility of success” 
for the self-regulatory body (Lee, 2008, p. 279).   
 
2.3.2.2. Code Relevance 
“Code relevance” refers to the degree to which the code responds to the needs 
of the stakeholders in the marketplace. According to Purchase, the ability to 
“accommodate gradual change” is an important variable in Code effectiveness 
(2004. P. 91). “Shifts in tastes, technologies and the numbers of buyers or sellers 
and/or their sophistication can make rules obsolete and in need of elimination or 
redrafting,” he says (Purchase, 2004. P. 91). To this end, an effective code 
needs to be updated regularly to reflect these changing conditions (Industry 
Canada, 2002, p. 15). However, the relevance to the code must also cover the 
public‟s needs and the issues demanded by them “and not merely those 
preferred by industry” (Sethi, 2005, p. 82).  
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the advantages of self-regulation is that industry 
practitioners have more expertise and technical knowledge than public officials – 
and are therefore better placed to develop appropriate rules. This increased 
relevance enhances the probability of the effectiveness of and compliance to the 
regulations (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 7). Conversely, the probability of non-
compliance is increased when the interests of those being regulated are ignored 
(Schulz & Held, 2001, p. A-6). Lee also raises the importance of industry 
expertise to the success of a code, and argues “industry members tend to 
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comply with self-regulation guidelines, if the guidelines are articulated with 
industry expertise” (2008, p. 279). 
 
2.3.2.3. Stakeholder Participation 
Stakeholder participation contributes invaluably to a code‟s viability – the wider 
the participation the more effective it is likely to be (Purchase, 2004, p. 83). 
Conversely, a “low level of industry participation and absence of the bigger 
companies usually result in failure of self-regulation” (Lee, 2008, p. 279). A code 
that is viewed as imposed by external parties – e.g. government bodies – has a 
lower chance of generating the required commitment from the participating firms 
(Harker & Harker, 2000, p. 157). The credibility drawn from the sense of 
ownership invaluably strengthens the effort in ensuring compliance. For that 
reason, the process of setting up the codes and crafting the enforcement regime 
thereof has to be decidedly consensual among the participating firms (Purchase, 
2004, p. 83). Consensual decision-making increases the likelihood of compliant 
behaviour from the participating firms, while non-consensual approaches raise 
the likelihood for hostility from those who are affected by the code but excluded 
from its decision-making processes (Purchase, 2004, p. 83).  
 
However, participation should not be limited to industry players and should also 
be extended to consumers. One of the important objectives of Codes is to “gain 
consumer confidence and trust” (Purchase 2004, p. 81). Price and Verhulst 
argue that effective self-regulation needs the involvement of consumers and 
citizens throughout its development and implementation – and that “without user 
involvement, a self-regulatory mechanism will not accurately reflect user needs 
and will not be effective in delivering the standards it promotes” (1999, p. 15). 
Harker and Harker also agree that public and consumer groups should 
participate in the development of the code (2000, p. 158). To this end, regulatory 
institutions must be proactive in educating it beneficiaries about the code so that 
they are able to use it for their benefit (Reding, 2007, p. 5).  
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2.3.2.4. Code Enforcement 
For any self-regulatory effort to be effective, the participating firms must comply 
with its code of conduct. In the majority of instances the voluntary compliance of 
code participants is the main type of compliance – with each firm putting in place 
self-restraining and self-monitoring efforts (Purchase, 2004, p. 86). However, to 
ensure compliance in the majority of instances and enhance the effectiveness of 
the self-regulatory regime “enforcement mechanisms and power are necessary” 
(Lee, 2003, p. 280). Code enforcement is greatly enhanced when compliance is 
not solely dependent on these self-monitoring efforts, and can be monitored by 
outside parties. To this end, non-compliant conduct should be simple to identify 
by such outside parties – i.e. by regulators, competitors, members of the public, 
etc (Purchase, 2004, p. 87). Lee agrees with this view and argues “monitoring 
compliance by public authorities is believed to enhance industry members' 
adherence to self-regulation” (Lee, 2003, p. 280). 
 
The appropriate use of sanctions for non-compliance is important in ensuring an 
effective industry code of conduct (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 16). There are 
various options within the arsenal of sanctions that self-regulatory regimes can 
use – including public disclosure, expulsion and financial penalties. The role that 
sanctions play is two-fold: “to deter the offender (and thus encourage compliance 
with rules) and to repair or cure a breach of the rules” (Price & Verhulst, 1999, p. 
38). Some scholars maintain that compliance may be attained by means of 
informal methods such as public disclosure or the naming and shaming of those 
that violate the code (Lenox & Nash, 2003, p. 4). However, there is stronger 
evidence to suggest that more formal and explicit sanctions are required to more 
vigorously encourage compliance (Lenox & Nash, 2003, p. 4). There is a strong 
argument that “the absence of genuinely dissuasive and punitive sanctions is 
seen as a major weakness in a code” (Price & Verhulst, 1999, p. 37). 
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2.3.2.5. Impact of the Code 
The “impact of the Code” refers to whether the Code has achieved its intended 
objectives or has had unintended negatives consequences. 
 
As mentioned earlier, self-regulation might be accused of not being forceful 
enough (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 8) as the “reputation or organisational sanctions” 
for code transgressions are potentially inadequate (Latzer, et al., 2003, p. 141). 
This may lead to the self-regulation effort being   ineffective in achieving its 
objectives (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 8).  Industry Canada argues that the “key 
evaluation criteria are results-based indicators that provide information about the 
achievement of objectives, such as whether accidents are reduced, customers 
are more satisfied, or environmental quality is improved” (2002, p. 16). Therefore, 
the achievement of stated objectives is an important determinant of the 
effectiveness of a Code. 
 
Further, self-regulation efforts may have the unintended negative consequences 
(Industry Canada, 2002, p. 19) of, amongst other things, leading to “collusion and 
anti-competitive behaviour” (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 8).  Further, self regulation 
codes may place “different burdens on different parties in the same sector” – e.g. 
small versus big business (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 19). Therefore, an 
environmental scan of the results of self-regulation – including those not intended 
– is important in determining the effectiveness of a Code. 
 
2.4. Summary 
 
 The evaluation of the effectiveness of the WASPA Code of Conduct touches on 
numerous concepts. The response to market failure and the requirement to 
protect consumers give rise to the need for market regulation. The desire to have 
the most efficient, and potentially effective, form of regulation then leads to the 
discussion on the notion of self-regulation. The effort of self-regulation is built 
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around the use of a code of conduct as the central tool – which sets the 
parameters for what conduct is acceptable and what is not. The successful 
design and implementation of the code of conduct is key to the effectiveness of 
the self-regulation regime, and ultimately to high aspiration of consumer 
protection.  
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3. CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter looks at the research question and the methodology the study 
employs. The research question has numerous sub-questions that are structured 
to mirror the five themes around which the analytical framework is structured. 
The study uses the interpretive approach – with a qualitative methodology and 
semi-structured interviews. 
 
3.1. Research Question  
 
WASPs “provide mobile applications and content such as subscription services, 
competitions, ringtones and news alerts as well as bulk SMS messaging to 
corporate customers and directly to consumers” (MyBroadband, 2008).  
 
As discussed earlier, the numerous challenges facing the wireless applications 
industry in South Africa includes, amongst other things, lack of transparency 
around services and the pricing thereof, minors accessing adult services, 
competitions and spam. WASPA is the industry‟s self-regulatory regime and 
employs its Code of Conduct as the primary instrument in responding to these 
challenges. The research problem is that it is unclear whether the WASPA has 
been successful. The purpose of this study is to evaluate how effective the 
WASPA Code has been in regulating the behaviour of the WASPs in South 
Africa. The analytical framework to be employed for the evaluation of the WASPA 
Code is structured around five key themes from the literature review: institutional 
positioning, code relevance, stakeholder participation, code enforcement and 
code impact.  
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3.1.1. Main Research Question  
The main research question for this study is: How effective has the WASPA 
Code of Conduct been in regulating the behaviour of the Wireless Application 
Service Providers in South Africa? 
 
3.1.2. Research Sub Questions  
The main research question has numerous sub-questions – and these are listed 
below in Table 5. The sub-questions are structured to mirror the five themes 
around which the analytical framework is structured – i.e. institutional positioning, 
code relevance, stakeholder participation, code enforcement and impact of the 
code.  
 
Table 5: Research Sub-Questions 
Theme  Sub-Questions  
Institutional Positioning   • Is WASPA well established?  
Code Relevance 
 • Does the WASPA Code address a fundamental 
problem or an actual need?  
Stakeholder Participation  
 • Has the WASPA Code achieved wide coverage?  
 • Has the WASPA Code development been open, 
transparent, fair and meaningful?  
Code Enforcement 
 • Is there a range of appropriate negative consequences 
and incentives for compliance with the WASPA Code?  
Impact of the Code 
 • Have the objectives of the WASPA Code been 
achieved? 
 • Are there unintended or negative effects of the 
WASPA Code? 
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3.2. Interpretive Approach  
 
There are three main approaches to research studies – positivism, interpretive 
social science and critical social science (Neuman, 1997, p. 62). The positivism 
approach is concerned with testing and confirming specific laws as captured in a 
particular theory, and is therefore associated with quantitative methods that seek 
precise measures (Neuman, 1997, p. 63). “Quantitative methods lend 
themselves to testing hypothesized relationships or causal explanations,” (Elliot, 
et al., 1999, p. 216). Some of the important issues that this approach is 
concerned with include empirical evidence and verifiability of data (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2001, p. 22). A common criticism of positivism is that it ignores, in its 
enquiry, the texture of people‟s social context and their ability to think and feel 
(Neuman, 1997, p. 74). Conversely, interpretive social science acknowledges 
this social context and is more concerned with revealing how people feel and 
view their world, rather than testing or confirming laws on their behaviour 
(Neuman, 1997, p. 73). This approach evaluates reality according to how people 
who experience it on an ongoing basis understand it (Babbie & Mouton, 2001, p. 
29). It is therefore associated with qualitative methods that seek to understand 
rather than measure. An important criticism of interpretive social science is that it 
treats all views as equal, irrespective of whether or not they are on the right side 
of social justice (Neuman, 1997, p. 74). Critical social science is similar to 
interpretive social science in that it acknowledges the social context within which 
people exist. However, this approach deliberately enquires from a moral 
perspective, and as a result does not treat all views as equal. Critical social 
science is seen as a crusader for social justice, and tackles prejudice in whatever 
sphere of society it manifest itself – including sexism, racism and other forms of 
discrimination (Neuman, 1997, p. 74). 
 
Table 6 below summarises the differences among the three approaches to 
research.  
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Table 6: Differences between Approaches to Research 
 Positivism  
Interpretive Social 
Science 
Critical Social 
Science 
Reason for 
research 
To discover natural 
laws so people can 
predict and control 
events 
To understand and 
describe meaningful 
social action 
To smash myths 
and empower 
people to change 
society radically 
Good evidence 
Is based on precise 
observations that 
others can repeat 
Is embedded in the 
context of fluid 
social interactions 
Is informed by a 
theory that unveils 
illusions  
Place for values 
Science is value 
free, and values 
have no place 
except when 
choosing a topic 
Values are an 
integral part of 
social life: no 
group‟s values are 
wrong, only 
different 
All science must 
begin with a value 
proposition; some 
positions are right, 
some are wrong 
Source: Adapted from Neuman, 1997, p. 83 
 
 
This research study is grounded in the interpretive social science approach. As 
stated earlier, the objective of the study is to understand whether the WASPA 
Code of Conduct has been effective in regulating the behaviour of the Wireless 
Applications Service Providers in South Africa. The objective of the study is not 
to test any law relating to the said effectiveness – but to evaluate the 
effectiveness as understood by the main role-players in the WASP industry. 
Further, the study does not propose any specific value proposition relating to the 
justice – or lack thereof – inherent in the conduct of WASPA members as they go 
about their business. It sees all perspectives, across the variety of role-players, 
as valid and legitimate. Within this context, the most appropriate approach is the 
interpretive social science option.  
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3.2.1. Qualitative Methodology  
The most suitable option for the interpretive social science approach to research 
is a qualitative methodology (Babbie & Mutton, 2001, p. 33). “The goal of 
qualitative research is understanding issues or particular situations by 
investigating the perspectives and behavior of the people in these situations and 
the context within which they act,” (Kaplan & Maxwell, 2005, p. 30). As stated 
earlier, the intention of this research study is evaluate the effectiveness of the 
WASPA Code as understood by the main role-players in the wireless 
applications industry in the country. Therefore the qualitative methodology is 
appropriate. 
 
There are numerous types of qualitative research designs – and these are listed 
in Table 7 in the following page. A common characteristic amongst them is that 
they all entail in-depth examination of phenomena in their natural – or real world 
– environment (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 133). “Qualitative research is 
conducted in natural settings and uses data in the form of words rather than 
numbers,” (Kaplan & Maxwell, 2005, p. 30). In the case study design, a particular 
phenomenon is studied for a defined period of time (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 
135). Instead of looking at only one phenomenon, the ethnography design 
studies an entire group – with a focus on the cultural norms and beliefs shared by 
members of the said group (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 137). The 
phenomenological study “attempts to understand people‟s perceptions, 
perspectives, and understandings of a particular situation” (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005, p. 139). The grounded theory design employs a set of processes for 
examining data from which to build a theoretical model – i.e. the theory is 
grounded in the data (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 140). This design is particularly 
useful when there are no theories about a specific phenomenon, or when the 
current ones are insufficient (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 140). The content 
analysis design is a methodical inspection of the contents of typically some form 
of communication material – e.g. books, music, films, etc – with the intention of 
discovering patterns or themes (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 142).  
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Table 7: Qualitative Designs 
Design  Purpose  
Case Study  To understand one or more phenomena in great depth 
Ethnography  To understand how behaviours reflect the culture of a group 
Phenomenological Study 
To understand an experience from the participants‟ 
perspective 
Grounded Theory Study To derive a theory from data collected in a natural setting 
Content Analysis To identify the specific characteristics of a body of material 
Source: Adapted from Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 144 
 
3.2.2. Phenomenological Study 
While the study into the effectiveness of the WASPA Code has some 
characteristics of a single case study, it does not meet all the requirements to be 
categorised as one. It does not, in the strict sense of the term, study the WASPA 
Code “in depth for a defined period of time” – as defined per Leedy and Ormrod‟s 
definition of case studies (2005, p. 135). The study more closely displays the 
characteristics of a phenomenological study, where the researcher tries to 
understand the WASP industry stakeholders‟ “perceptions, perspectives, and 
understandings of a particular situation” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 139). 
According to Welman and Kruger (as cited in Groenewald, 2004), the researcher 
in this type of study is “concerned with understanding social and psychological 
phenomena from the perspectives of people involved,” (Groenewald, 2004, p. 5). 
  
3.3. Data Collection 
 
There is a wide variety of data collection approaches available. Figure 1 in the 
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following page plots the various approaches along a continuum from the less 
structured and informal options to the more structured and formal (Kusek & Rist, 
2004, p. 86). The options on the formal side – e.g. experiments, census, surveys, 
and questionnaires – are expected to provide relatively more precise quantitative 
data. Conversely, the options of the informal side – e.g. review of official records 
and interviews – are expected to provide more in-depth qualitative insights. The 
informal and less structured methods are more appropriate for a qualitative study 
such as this – and “phenomenological researchers depend almost entirely on 
lengthy interviews (perhaps one or two hours in length) with a carefully selected 
sample of participants (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 139).  
 
Figure 1: Data Collection Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1. Triangulation 
Any research study is accompanied by a requirement to verify the validity of the 
information uncovered (Tellis, 1997, p. 5). The use of triangulation – i.e. the use 
of multiple data sources to improve the validity of evaluation findings and 
eliminate bias - fulfils this requirement (Tellis, 1997, p. 5). In general, 
triangulating multiple sources of data is expected to result in a single proposition 
about the phenomenon being studied – i.e. what Mathison calls “convergence” of 
the various data (Mathison, 1988, p. 13). However, “convergence” is only one of 
Conversation 
with concerned 
individuals 
Community 
interviews 
Reviews of 
official records 
Participant 
observation 
Individual 
interviews 
Focus group 
interviews 
Direct 
observation 
Questionnaires 
Field 
experiments 
Census 
One-time 
survey 
Panel 
surveys 
Informal and less structured methods Formal and more structured methods 
Source: Adapted from Kusek & Rist, 2004, p. 85 
 Itumeleng Tumi Mokgoro 0400072N 42 
three possible outcomes (Mathison, 1988, p. 13). In the “inconsistency” outcome 
the range of data might not correspond to this single viewpoint about a social 
phenomenon. Rather, the facts from data sources might present different 
propositions – i.e. not conforming, but also not conflicting (Mathison, 1988, p. 
15). In “contradiction”, the difference in the viewpoints from the various data 
sources goes a step further and now conflict with each other (Mathison, 1988, p. 
15). Importantly, all three outcomes are used in research studies. The researcher 
accepts that, in many instances, the interview participants hold different views on 
particular aspects of the effectiveness of the WASPA Code. These views may be 
informed by, amongst other things, the type of organisation they represent, and 
its bargaining power relative to other players within the industry. These 
differences – and similarities – are invaluable as they contribute to the 
conception of patterns from the data.     
 
The research study uses two main data sources from the numerous options 
discussed above for triangulation. These sources are official records and 
interviews. As an example, data is not only compared between the various 
individual interview participants, but also between the interview outcomes and 
data from the official records. The study is divided into two phases – the review 
of official records takes place in phase one; and the interviews take place in 
phase two. The official records are employed to reveal important historical data 
and decision-making patterns on, amongst other things, Code revisions and 
enforcement. The interviews are employed to reveal insights from influential and 
well-informed professionals in the wireless application industry. Importantly, the 
interviews are employed to uncover those insights that are not available from 
official records. Therefore, the two data sources may be viewed as 
complementary.  
  
3.3.2. Review of Official Records 
The WASPA website is, compared to other sources, the central input information 
for the review of official records – with rich quantitative data on the 
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implementation of the Code from inception to date. All historical adjudications, 
Code of Conduct versions and other pertinent publications can be found on the 
WASPA website. However, it is important to note that the study looks only at data 
from the period years 2006 to 2008. Data from the first year of the Code‟s 
operation, i.e. 2005, is excluded from the study, as the Code was not sufficiently 
established in its maiden year for the researcher to perform a credible evaluation 
of its performance. Similarly, at the time of data collection the Code‟s 2009 data 
was still incomplete and would compromise the evaluation for that year‟s 
performance.  
 
The data from the website is used mostly as a guide for the interview process. 
For example, knowing which companies are serial Code transgressors helps 
identify interview participants with a “serial Code transgressor” perspective; and 
knowing how frequently the Code is revised draws attention to “the impact of 
frequent Code revisions” as an important interview discussion. 
 
3.3.3. Individual Interviews 
The individual interview is an established data collection tool in qualitative 
research (Babbie & Mouton, 2004, p. 289). The various types of individual 
interviews employed in qualitative research approaches include open-ended and 
focused or semi-structured (Tellis, 1997, p. 7). In an open-ended interview, the 
researcher is able to question and probe – which gives participants the space to 
respond in their own words (Babbie & Mouton, 2004, p. 289). In a semi-
structured interview, the researcher is guided by the interview protocol. This type 
of interview is relatively brief and quick to the point as it follows a focused 
framework (Tellis, 1997, p. 7). This research study uses the semi-structured 
interview approach. As with the research sub-questions, in interview protocol is 
structured to mirror the five themes around which the analytical framework is 
structured – i.e. institutional positioning, code relevance, stakeholder 
participation, code enforcement and impact of the code. The researcher pilots the 
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interview with a respondent who is familiar with the subject, in order to verify that 
the interview protocol is appropriate – prior to conducting the interviews.  
 
There are sixteen participants interviewed – who are selected as a result of their 
high interest in the effectiveness of the WASPA Code of Conduct and according 
to specific criteria guided by their job specifications. As stated earlier, the 
interviews are employed to reveal insights from well-informed industry 
professionals.  
 
The semi-structured interview allows the researcher to engage the participants 
and collect their responses by personal means from personal interaction. Further, 
in all interviews a tape recorder is used to ensure accurate data collection. The 
interview is preceded by a brief introduction, which outlines the purpose of the 
study and some of the key principles that guide it – e.g. confidentiality. The 
interviewer also records valuable demographic data before the interview begins – 
e.g. name, company, etc. The content of the interview is broken down into five 
sections: institutional positioning, code relevance, stakeholder participation, code 
enforcement and impact of the code. 
 
Annexure 1 outlines the case study interview protocol used in this research 
study.  
 
3.3.4. Purposive Sampling  
Sampling approaches are segmented into two broad categories: probability and 
non-probability. In a probability sampling approach every unit or element in the 
population has a chance of being selected in the sample – and that “non-zero 
probability” can be determined (Cooper & Schindler, 2003, p. 183). In other 
words, “every element in the target population must have a known chance of 
being selected into the sample,” (Terre Blanche & Durrheim, 1999, p. 276). 
Importantly, the random selection approach reduces sampling bias and increases 
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the sample‟s representivity of the population from which it is taken. Conversely, 
in a non-probability sampling approach not all units in the population have a 
known “non-zero probability” of being selected (Cooper & Schindler, 2003, p. 
183). Some units actually have a “zero probability” of being selected. Therefore, 
the selection approach here is not “statistical randomness” (Terre Blanche and 
Durrheim, 1999, p. 279) – and units selected must fit particular criteria.  
 
Importantly, one of the instances where researchers use non-probability 
sampling is when “planning in-depth qualitative research” (Terre Blanche & 
Durrheim, 1999, p. 279). Therefore, the sampling method used for the interviews 
in this research study is purposive sampling, a form of non-probability sampling – 
which is considered by some academics as “the most important kind of non-
probability sampling,” (Groenewald, 2004, p. 8). All the interview participants are 
“a carefully selected sample of participants” (Leedy and Ormrod, 2005, p. 139) 
according to the researcher‟s judgment and the objectives of the study 
(Groenewald, 2004, p. 8). The interview participants are the primary unit of 
analysis (Groenewald, 2004, p. 9) – and the study attempts to understand their 
“perceptions, perspectives, and understandings” of the effectiveness of the 
WASPA Code.  
 
The sampling process begins with the researcher deciding what precondition the 
interview participants must meet to be interviewed (Merriam, 2002, p. 12). 
Purposive sampling requires that the interview participants selected are 
“information-rich cases” (Merriam, 2002, p. 12). In this instance the participants 
are selected from senior management in the WASP or related industries. It is 
important to reflect on the viability of a sampling plan in terms of, amongst other 
things, the availability of time and monetary resources (Curtis, Gesler, Smith and 
Washburn, 2000, pg. 1003). The availability of these resources – or lack thereof 
in the case of this research study – has a significant bearing on how practical it is 
to implement any sampling plan. The users of WASP services are the direct 
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beneficiaries of WASP services and their perspective is important to this study. 
However, they are excluded from the sample because of limited time resources. 
  
Another important step in the sampling process is to ensure that sample selected 
improves the “generalizability” of the findings (Curtis, et al., p. 1003). The sample 
must enable the researcher to use the perspectives of the sampled interview 
participants to arrive at deductions that can be generalized to the overall 
population. To that end, the selection of interview respondents is further informed 
by the requirement to get a wide range of views – in order to improve the 
“generalizability” of the findings. As a result, they are selected from organisations 
with varying roles in the industry value-chain. The views sought include those 
from representatives of, amongst others: the WASPA organisation, WASPA 
member companies, companies that are non-WASPA members, network 
operators and independent industry commentators.  
 
A further step in the sampling process is determining the appropriate sample 
size. In phenomenological studies, “a typical sample size is from 5 to 25 
individuals, all of whom have had a direct experience with the phenomenon being 
studied” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 139). The sample size for this study is 
sixteen interview participants.   
 
3.3.5. Data Analysis 
The “central task during the data analysis is to identify common themes in 
people‟s descriptions of their experiences” of the WASPA Code (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2005, p. 140). Importantly, the unearthed data is classified and analysed 
in terms of the themes from the analysis framework – which takes the same 
structure as the interview protocol. Both tools are sculpted from the themes 
identified from the literature review. The researcher looks wider than the views of 
individual role players on the issues raised and also takes into account the views 
of groups of role players – and how they relate to each other (Tellis, 1997, p. 5).  
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Finally, the researcher pulls together all the themes to create a singular picture of 
the effectiveness of the WASPA Code. 
 
3.4. Summary 
 
The research question for this research study is: How effective has the WASPA 
Code of Conduct been in regulating the behaviour of the Wireless Application 
Service Providers in South Africa? In addition, the main research question has 
numerous sub-questions. These sub-questions are structured to mirror the five 
themes around which the analytical framework is structured.  
 
This research study is grounded in the interpretive social science approach – 
which is concerned with revealing how people feel and view their world (Neuman, 
1997, p. 73). Similarly, the objective of the study is to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the WASPA Code as understood by the main role-players in the WASP 
industry. This is a qualitative study – with a phenomenological approach, where 
the researcher tries to understand the WASP industry stakeholders‟ “perceptions, 
perspectives, and understandings” of the Code (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 139). 
The qualitative study employs the more informal and less structured data 
collection methods – i.e. review of official records and semi-structured interviews. 
The WASPA website is the central source of input information – historical Code 
adjudications, numerous Code versions, etc – for the review of official records. 
The sampling method used for the interviews is purposive sampling.  
 
The next chapter is a discussion of the research study‟s results. The chapter is 
divided into two sections – results from the review of official records and results 
from the individual interviews. 
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4. CHAPTER 4: RESULTS FROM QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
 
As discussed earlier, the analytical framework employed for the evaluation of the 
WASPA Code is structured around five key themes from the literature review: 
institutional positioning, code relevance, stakeholder participation, code 
enforcement and code impact. In addition, the research sub-questions and the 
interview protocol are both structured to mirror these five themes around which 
the analytical framework is structured. Further, the discussion around the results 
of the research study follows a similar structure. This applies to both the results 
from the review of official records and the results from the semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
4.1. Review of Official Records 
 
The WASPA website is, compared to other sources, the central input information 
for the review of official records – with rich data on historical adjudications, Code 
of Conduct versions and other pertinent publications. The data from the website 
is used mostly as a guide for the interview process. For example, knowing which 
companies are serial Code transgressors helps identify interview participants 
with a “serial Code transgressor” perspective; and knowing how frequently the 
Code is revised draws attention to “the impact of frequent Code revisions” as an 
important interview discussion. 
 
4.1.1. Institutional Positioning 
4.1.1.1. Industry Support 
WASPA membership stood at more than one-hundred organisations by the end 
of the period under review between 2006 and 2008 (Perlman, 2008). Importantly, 
two out of the three main mobile network operators as at 2008 make membership 
to the organisation a prerequisite to doing business with them (Perlman, 2006). 
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“MTN requires all content providers providing content via its network to belong to 
WASPA and adhere to its Code of Conduct” (Senne & Burows, 2005). There are 
some indications that Vodacom has “WASPs using its network for content 
distribution which are not WASPA members” (Muller, 2008). This suggests that 
Vodacom is the one operator where WASPA membership is not a prerequisite for 
doing business – and that Cell C is the other operator that makes WASPA 
membership compulsory. The enforcement of the WASPA Code also extends to 
“information providers” (Perlman, 2006). According to clause 2.13 of the WASPA 
Code, an “information provider” is “any person on whose behalf a wireless 
application service provider may provide a service, and includes message 
originators” (WASPA, 2010). Clause 1.6 of the WASPA Code below – which was 
introduced in Code version 4.3 on 20 April 2006 – refers to this extension of the 
WASPA Code to “information providers”. 
 
Some companies may be required to comply with the WASPA code by 
virtue of a contract with one or more network operators and/or a contract 
with one or more voting WASPA members. In such cases, all clauses in 
the Code of Conduct and the WASPA Advertising Rules that are binding 
on WASPA members shall be deemed to be binding on those companies, 
irrespective of whether or not those companies are members of WASPA. 
(WASPA, 2010) 
 
WASPA‟s self-regulation enforcement is partially funded by the three mobile 
network operators in the market as at 2008 – Vodacom, MTN and Cell C 
(Perlman, 2006). In addition, the WASPA membership fees pay for the 
organisation‟s day-to-day activities of industry promotion (Perlman, 2006). 
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4.1.2. Code Relevance 
4.1.2.1. Evaluation and Revision of the Code 
Code revision is seen as important as it keeps the Code relevant. As mentioned 
earlier, the CodeCom is responsible for developing and implementing the 
WASPA Code of Conduct – and this includes its revision. Membership to the 
CodeCom is open to any individual or entity that wishes to join – and participating 
in the Code revision forums is the main responsibility of a CodeCom member. 
These include the quarterly Code review workshops and the e-mail discussion 
forums. Table 9 below lists the steps followed by the CodeCom in revising the 
Code (WASPA, n.d.). 
 
Table 8: Code Change and Ratification Process 
Note: T = Date of a CodeCom workshop. 
Step 1: T - 1 week 
Deadline for any proposed changes to the current version of the 
Code to be submitted to the Secretariat. 
Step 2: T 
CodeCom meets to review an annotated version of the Code, 
and to discuss any proposed changes. 
Step 3: T + 1 or 
days 
Secretariat circulates a revised version of the Code for 
CodeCom to comment on. 
Step 4: T + 1 
week 
Deadline for CodeCom to comment on the revised draft. 
Step 5: T + 1 
week + 1 or 2 
days  
Secretariat circulates the revised draft to ManCom, including 
any subsequent comments made by CodeCom. 
Step 6: T + 2 
weeks 
Deadline for ManCom to comment on the revisions.  
Step 7: T + 3 
weeks 
Secretariat circulates a revised version, taking ManCom 
changes into account, to CodeCom for a final round of 
comment. 
Step 8: T + 4 
weeks 
Deadline for final comments from CodeCom. 
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Step 9: T + 4 
weeks + 1 or 2 
days 
ManCom teleconference held to review any final comments 
from CodeCom, and to ratify some or all of the changes. 
Step 10: T + 5 
weeks 
Revised version of the Code promulgated. 
Source: Adapted from WASPA, n.d.  
 
 
There have been eleven versions of WASPA Code of Conduct in force during the 
period under review – i.e. 2006-2008 (WASPA, n.d.b.). Figure 2 on the following 
page shows how long each of the eleven published versions was in force for. The 
terms of the various Code versions vary considerably – and range between one 
and seven months long. The terms of the first and the last Code versions extend 
to before and beyond the period under review respectively – and were in 
operation for the longest duration of seven months each. Version 3.2 was in 
operation from 1 September 2005 to 20 April 2006, and version 6.2 from 14 
August 2008 to 25 March 2009. Versions 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.92 were in force for 
approximately two months each – which represents the second shortest term. 
Versions 5.2 and 6.1 had the shortest terms of one month each.  
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Figure 2: Duration of Published WASPA Code Versions 
 
 
The WASPA Code has had fourteen chapters across all the eleven Code 
versions during the period under review – i.e. 2006-2008. The chapters are 
(WASPA, 2010): 
 
 Introduction 
 Definitions 
 General provisions 
 Customer relations 
 Commercial communications 
 Advertising and pricing 
 Children‟s services 
 Adult services 
 Competitions 
 Contact and dating services 
 Subscription services 
 Miscellaneous 
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 Complaints procedures 
 References  
 
The nature and scope of the Code revisions across the eleven versions vary 
considerably. These revisions include, amongst other things, re-numbering of 
clauses, changing section heading, adding new definitions and enhancing the 
power of certain clauses in contentious areas. The headings of all the sections, 
except one, have remained unchanged during the period under review. The 
“Miscellaneous” section was called “Charitable promotions” in version 3.2 of the 
Code; then revised to “Other services” in version 5.2; and finally revised to 
“Miscellaneous” in version 5.3. The number of revisions to clause 5.1.3 suggests 
it has been one of the more contentious areas. The clause has been revised four 
times. It was introduced in version 3.1, and revised in versions 4.3, 4.92, 6.1 and 
6.2. It is captured within section five – which deals with “Commercial 
communications” – and sub-section 5.1 – which deals with “Sending of 
commercial communications”.  
 
Clause 5.1.3‟s original wording in Code version 3.2 is fairly vague. The clause 
reads:  
 
Where feasible, customers should be able to unsubscribe from any 
subscription service using no more than two words, one of which must be 
'STOP'. (WASPA, 2010, p. 12) 
 
The last guise of clause 5.1.3 is more than four times longer than the original 
wording. In this instance, the Code goes into considerably more detail. It 
includes, amongst other things, the type of communications affected by the 
clause, and an example of how the customers should be guided in “opting out” of 
such “commercial communications”. In Code version 6.2, clause 5.1.3 reads: 
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For SMS and MMS communications, a recipient should be able to stop 
receiving messages from any service by replying with the word „STOP‟. If 
a reply could pertain to multiple services, either all services should be 
terminated, or the recipient should be given a choice of service to 
terminate. The reply „STOP‟ procedure should be made clear to the 
recipient at the start of any messaging service, for example by including 
“reply STOP to opt out” in the first message sent. If it is not technically 
feasible for the recipient to reply to a specific message then clear 
instructions for unsubscribing must be included in the body of that 
message. (WASPA, 2010, p. 12) 
 
4.1.3. Stakeholder Participation 
4.1.3.1. Sources of Complaints 
Figure 3 below shows the spread of the source of complaints from 2006 to 2008 
across the Advertising Standards Authority or ASA, WASPA, WASPA members 
or competitors, and the public. In 2006 the sources of complaints from members 
of the public and WASP competitors were equal at fifty-two each or fifty percent 
each – with the Advertising Standards Authority contributing only one complaint 
or less than one percent. In 2007 WASPA through, amongst others, the Media 
Monitor, lodged sixteen complains or nineteen percent of overall complaints – 
with the public now the leading source of complaints at forty complaints or forty-
seven percent and WASP competitors at twenty-nine complaints or thirty-four 
percent. In 2008, WASPA‟s contribution rose sharply to fifty-nine or thirty-one 
percent and the public‟s role grew significantly to one-hundred and six complaints 
or fifty-six percent – while complaints lodged by WASP competitors declined to 
twenty-three complaints or twelve percent.  
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Figure 3: Source of Complaints 
 
 
4.1.4. Code Enforcement 
4.1.4.1. Processing Complaints 
The WASPA Code of Conduct contains procedures to be followed in the event of 
a complaint lodged against any WASPA member. These complaints are 
segmented into informal and formal. Informal complaints comprise ninety percent 
of the complaints WASPA deals with and these are usually resolved in forty-eight 
hours. Informal complaints – which are mostly made-up of “unsubscribe 
requests” (ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010) – are explained further below. Formal 
complaints requiring an adjudication process comprise just ten percent of the 
complaints handled by WASPA (MyBroadband, 2008). In 2006 the total number 
of formal complaints was one-hundred and eighteen, with a fifteen percent drop 
in 2007 to one-hundred complaints, and a one-hundred and eleven percent 
increase in 2008 to two-hundred and eleven complaints (WASPA website, un-
dated). 
 
The complaints process begins when a consumer or competitor complainant 
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submits to WASPA a complaint via Web, email, fax, direct contact, or through the 
mobile network operator‟s customer care, with the details of the alleged offence 
and the service provider involved. WASPA‟s Media Monitor service – that 
monitors and proactively checks for compliance – can also submit complaints. 
The Media Monitor uses television and print-media clipping services to monitor 
services – and has a range of live SIM cards to test for, amongst other things, 
reminder messages, spam, quality or service and correct billing (Perlman, 2008, 
p. 22).  
 
The WASPA secretariat then forwards a copy of the complaint to the service 
provider to respond, or resolve if required, within five business days. Failure to 
respond within the allotted time is an infringement of the Code of Conduct, and 
attracts default sanctions. The case is closed only if the complainant indicates 
that the issue has been satisfactorily resolved – and this is deemed an informal 
resolution. However, if the complainant is not satisfied that the issue has been 
resolved, the WASPA secretariat deems the case to be serious, and escalates it 
to formal adjudication (Perlman, 2008, p. 28). 
 
There are fourteen independent adjudicators – all ICT lawyers. Each case is 
assigned to one adjudicator, and the resolution thereof can take anything from 
one to five weeks. Importantly, every decision can be appealed. A WASP has to 
pay an amount of ten thousand rands to lodge an appeal. However, the full 
amount is refunded if the appeal is successful. 
 
4.1.4.2. Number and Value of Fines 
The use of fines is an important part of WASPA‟s arsenal of sanctions. Other 
sanctions include, amongst other things, public disclosure through the WASPA 
website of details of the complaints and revocation of WASPA membership. The 
number of fines greater than R100 000 was constant for both 2006 and 2008 – at 
only one in each year. The number increased sharply to six in 2008. The trend of 
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sharp increases in 2008 is consistent across all categories of fines. This is also 
reflected in the corresponding increase in the average value of fines – from R11 
379 in 2007 to R33 163 in 2008. Figure 4 below shows the number and value of 
fines from 2006 to 2008. 
 
Figure 4: Number and Value of Fines 
 
 
4.1.5. Impact of Code 
4.1.5.1. Number and Nature of Complaints 
The number of “complaints not upheld” fell marginally from thirty-four in 2006 to 
twenty-two in 2007 – and increased by one-hundred percent in 2008 to forty-four. 
The number of “complaints upheld” decreased by eleven percent from seventy in 
2006 to sixty-two in 2007, and grew by one-hundred and thirty-two percent to one 
hundred and forty-four in 2008. 
 
The “nature of complaints” is dominated by subscription services. These services 
represent the largest single contributor of complaints between 2006 and 2008 – 
at thirty-five in 2006, twenty-one in 2007 and thirty-three in 2008. Complaints 
related to advertising have grown considerably – from the fifth individual 
contributor in 2006 to the second in 2007 and 2008. In 2008 the biggest areas of 
concern were subscription services, advertising, spam and competitions. Figure 
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5 below is a graphic representation of the number and nature of complaints from 
2006 to 2008.  
 
Figure 5: Number and Nature of Complaints 
 
 
4.1.5.2. Top Offenders 
The highest repeat offenders are also some of the biggest WASPs in the market. 
According to documentation submitted by Vodacom and Cointel to the 
Competition Tribunal, during its 2005 consideration of the merger between the 
two firms, forty-nine percent of Vodacom WASP revenue came from the top five 
providers: iTouch, Exactmobile, First National Bank, Cointel and Foneworx. It is 
highly probable that these ratios would be duplicated in relation to MTN and Cell 
C (Manoim, 2006, p. 2). Exactmobile, Cointel/ Vodacom and iTouch/ Buongiorno 
are also the in the top six transgressors of the WASPA Code for the period 2006 
to 2008. Figure 6 below shows the top WASPA Code offenders for the period 
2006 to 2008. 
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Figure 6: Top Offenders 
 
 
4.2. Individual Interviews 
 
This section is a summary of the results from the individual interviews. Each 
interview – as per the interview protocol – is divided according to the main 
themes from the analytical framework employed in this research study. 
 
Table 8 in the following page outlines the sixteen interview participants – and the 
reasons for their selection. Sixteen respondents we interviewed. Fifteen of them 
were engaged in face-to-face interviews and one telephonically. Further, eight 
respondents from the face-to-face interviews were interviewed in pairs. The 
interviewees are current or past senior management in the WASP or related 
industries – with the majority representing WASP firms with varying sizes and 
service focus. The type of organisation the interview respondents work for – and 
its role within the broader industry value chain – seems to influence their 
perceptions of the WASPA organisation and the WASPA Code quite significantly. 
With this in mind, the selection of interview respondents was informed by the 
researcher‟s requirement to get various views – and therefore interview 
respondents from organisations with varying roles in the industry value-chain.  
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The identities of the interview participants – and in most instances the 
organisations they work for – have been withheld. The participants include:  
 
 An independent ICT industry analyst;  
 A representative from the WASPA organisation;  
 A representative from one of the network operator‟s WASP partner 
management divisions;  
 Three ICT lawyers who are either current or past WASPA adjudicators;  
 Ten representatives from both large and small WASP firms.  
 
In some instances, the researcher used the snowball sampling method in order 
to access additional participants to interview. “Snowballing is a method of 
expanding the sample by asking one informant or participant to recommend 
others for interviewing,” (Groenewald, 2004, p. 9). ICTL1 was particularly helpful 
in this regard. Further, in all interviews – bar one with “WR”, which was 
telephonic – a tape recorder is used to ensure accurate data collection. 
 
Table 9: Interview Participants 
Interview Participant’s Code Reason for Selection 
Mr. Seshego Mahlo (SM) 
Interview pilot  with “Senior Content Specialist” 
from Vodacom 
ICT Industry Analyst (ICTIA) Independent voice 
WASPA Representative (WR) Insider‟s perspective 
Network operator Representative (NOR) Key player in value-chain  
WASP Firm Representative 1 (WFR1);  
WASP Firm Representative 2 (WFR2);  
WASP Firm Representative 3 (WFR3); 
Part of top five WASPs in revenue and offences. 
(WFR2 and WFR3 interviewed together) 
WASP Firm Representative 4 (WFR4);  
WASP Firm Representative 5 (WFR5);  
WASP Firm Representative 6 (WFR6) 
WASPA members and established B2B 
aggregators. (WFR5 and WFR6 interviewed 
together) 
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WASP Firm Representative 7 (WFR7);  
WASP Firm Representative 8 (WFR8) 
Emerging WASP (WFR7 and WFR8 interviewed 
together) 
WASP Firm Representative 9 (WFR9);  
WASP Firm Representative 10 (WFR10) 
Non-WASPA member (WFR9 and WFR10 
interviewed together) 
ICT Lawyer 1 (ICTL1);  
ICT Lawyer 2 (ICTL2);  
ICT Lawyer 3 (ICTL3) 
Present or past WASPA adjudicator 
 
 
The interview participants provide different perspectives. The ICT analyst 
provides a perspective with no conspicuous vested interest – and that 
independent voice is invaluable. The WASPA voice is important for its insider‟s 
perspective on the complexities of administering the self-regulatory regime. The 
network operators have a large and ever-present dominance over the industry 
and the delivery and billing of WASP services run over their networks. Their 
views on all matters WASP related are taken very seriously by the industry. The 
voice of the numerous WASPs – business-to-consumer players selling content 
products, business-to-business aggregators selling marketing services, 
companies with a presence in both areas, big companies with considerable 
resources, emerging companies with limited resources, WASPA members, non-
WASPA members – is invaluable. As the regulated entities, their perception of 
the effectiveness of the WASPA Code is of the outmost importance. To that end, 
the WASPs make up most of the interview participants. The adjudicators are at 
the coal-face of Code enforcement and have a very practical sense of how the 
Code interacts with the WASPA membership.  
 
4.2.1. Institutional Positioning 
Table 11 overleaf is a snapshot of the interview respondents‟ views regarding 
WASPA‟s institutional positioning. This is followed by a more detailed view of the 
results of the interviews. 
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Table 10: Institutional Positioning - Summary of Responses to Interview 
Questions 
Institutional Positioning Yes No 
Un-
clear 
Do you consider WASPA to be a credible and legitimate 
organisation?  
6 8 2 
Do you think the WASPA Code enjoys widespread support 
from the players in the industry?  
8 6 2 
Does WASPA have sufficient resources and expertise to 
enforce the Code?  
11 5 0 
 
4.2.1.1. WASPA Legitimacy and Credibility  
Six interview respondents out of sixteen believe that WASPA is a legitimate 
regulator of the WASP industry. It draws this legitimacy from the widespread 
acceptance and recognition of this role by the various stakeholders across 
Government, mobile network operators and the WASP industry. Importantly, 
most of the respondents who held negative sentiments towards WASPA still 
accepted and recognised this legitimacy. According to one respondent “the 
companies that make real money are all involved in WASPA because they all 
want to protect their revenue streams and make sure that everybody in the 
industry complies with consumer protection principles,” he says (WFR4, 
interview, 4 June 2010). In addition, another respondent sates that “the 
Department of Trade and Industry uses WASPA as a case study for self-
regulation” (WR, interview, 2 June 2010). Further, the network operators “have all 
given the undertaking to WASPA that they will support them if it is necessary to 
switch-off any WASP” (WR, interview, 2 June 2010). 
 
However, eight interview participants questioned WASPA‟s credibility – arguing 
that the organisation‟s leadership is “conflicted” by its dual role as industry 
players and WASPA representatives. According to one respondent, WASPA is 
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“conflicted” because of its two objectives that sometimes fight against each other 
– i.e. looking out for the consumers versus looking out for the WASPs (WFR2, 
interview, 4 June 2010). Another respondent believes that the “people that 
created WASPA were the same people who created the need for it” (WFR5, 
interview, 16 July 2010). This view is echoed by WFR7, who states that “WASPA 
is a referee and a player at the same time” as the same people who run the 
rogue WASPs also run WASPA (WFR7, interview, 13 August 2010).  
 
Worryingly, a number of interview participants argue that WASPA has been 
captured by the established firms in the industry. According to one interview 
respondent the WASPA organisation is a “boys club” or “cartel” that is run by the 
big WASP firms – and this fact compromises their independence. “They run 
WASPA for the benefit of the big players,” she says (WFR1, interview, 1 June 
2010). WFR8 adds that the lack of separation between the “player and referee” 
has resulted in WASPA being run by a “group of business owners who are 
protecting their turf” instead of focusing on the consumer protection mandate 
(WFR7 and WFR8, interview, 13 August 2010). Further, both WFR7 and WFR8 
believe that the Code is used to fight competitive battles within the WASP 
community – where certain companies are “targeted” with penalties while the 
bigger players are exempt from punishment (WFR7 and WFR8, interview, 13 
August 2010).  
 
4.2.1.2. Support for WASPA Code  
Eight interview participants out of sixteen believe that the WASPA Code enjoys 
wide support from the industry. One respondent believes that both WASPA and 
its Code enjoy some level of support from the network operators (ICTL2, 
interview, 3 July 2010). However, the degree of support differs between the three 
operators. To illustrate the point, he in indicates that MTN makes WASPA 
membership compulsory to doing business with them, and Vodacom makes 
signing up to the Code compulsory  (ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010). According to 
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another respondent “the network operators have all given the undertaking to 
WASPA that they will support them if it is necessary to switch-off any WASP” – 
which gives WASPA considerable teeth (WR, interview, 2 June 2010).  Further, 
ICTL1 argues that a lot of the WASPs are structuring their business around the 
Code (interview, 10 June 2010). While some might be unhappy with the penalties 
and the enforcement mechanism thereof, the majority should recognize why the 
enforcement is necessary. WR believes that “all the WASPs respect the Code, 
and sometimes maybe fear it, out of necessity” (interview, 2 June 2010). 
  
However, there are some differences in how the various WASPs relate to the 
Code. According to one respondent the WASPA members have differing views 
on the Code – and these are largely influenced by their business focus. “If your 
focus is bulk SMS and applications you might take a different view on content 
and the importance of content versus those WASPs for whom content and 
subscriptions are their primary business,” ICTL2 argues (interview, 3 July 2010). 
He contends that the more established players probably display greater support 
for the Code – as they have relatively more at stake should the Code, and 
therefore the industry fail. “The guys who were pushing the envelope last year 
are now the incumbent players in the industry and are trying to protect the 
industry,” he says. “Because of the low barriers to entry in the industry, there is 
always a new crowd knocking at the door and sometimes getting up to mischief” 
(ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010).  
 
4.2.1.3. WASPA Resources  
Eleven interview respondents out of sixteen believe that WASPA is adequately 
resourced to carry out its mandate. According to one interview respondent his 
organisation‟s contribution to WASPA is in the region of tens of thousands of 
rands every quarter – and therefore believes the collective financial contribution 
of all the network operators to be enough funding (NOR, interview, 4 June 2010). 
Membership fees also contribute to WASPA‟s coffers (WFR1, interview, I June 
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2010; WFR2, interview, 4 June 2010). Further, there is a view that WASPA has 
“people with the right expertise” on board both from a technical and legal 
perspective (NOR, interview, 4 June 2010) – with Leon Perlman, the WASPA 
chairman and the “driver” of the organisation, singled out as having a good 
reputation in the industry (WFR5, interview, 16 July). It seems WASPA does 
have sufficient resources to make sure that the cases are adjudicated – even 
though the adjudicators “are not paid industry-related fees” (ICTL1, interview, 10 
June). 
 
There are dissenting views that argue that WASPA is not adequately resourced. 
“There are over one hundred and fifty WASPs in South Africa, all running more 
than one service” (WFR5, interview, 16 July). However, the WASPA Monitor is 
too thinly resourced – manned by one or two people – to monitor what is going 
on out there in the market (WFR5, interview, 16 July). As a result, WASPA has 
become reactive and mostly acts as a response to complaints (ICTIA, interview, 
14 July). 
 
4.2.2. Code Relevance  
Table 12 below on the following page is a snapshot of the interview respondents‟ 
views regarding the relevance of the WASPA Code. This is followed by a more 
detailed view of the results of the interviews. 
 
Table 11: Code Relevance - Summary of Responses to Interview Questions 
Code Relevance Yes No 
Un-
clear 
Are the objectives of the WASPA Code still relevant today?  14 2 0 
Are the processes to evaluate and revise the Code 
effective and inclusive?  
9 6 1 
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4.2.2.1. Code Objectives 
All the interview respondents – bar the two whose company is not a member of 
WASPA – agree that the WASPA Code‟s objectives are relevant and that it 
seeks to address crucial industry problems. According to one interview 
respondent the aim of “protecting the industry from itself, protecting it from the 
risk takers and the troublemakers” is still valid (ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010). 
“Every time a consumer is caught with a bad service, the likelihood of them using 
a legitimate service in the future is impacted,” he says (ICTL2, interview, 3 July 
2010). The Code has a good framework in place that deals with the main themes 
– i.e. spam, subscription services, advertising conduct and adult service (ICTL1, 
interview, 10 June 2010). The themes will remain relevant for long time – but the 
provisions within these broad themes need to be updated constantly to respond 
to changes in the environment (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). Changes are 
sparked by numerous stimuli – e.g. the need to close existing loopholes that are 
exploited by the unscrupulous WASPs, responding to new technology and 
aligning the Code with new legislation (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010).  
 
There is a dissenting view from two interview participants that questions the 
relevance of the WASPA Code‟s objectives. Two interview respondents believe 
that WASPA is not able to respond to the requirements of the business-to-
business aggregators. This view alleges that WASPA was started by the 
business-to-consumer WASPs selling primarily content services – like ringtones, 
subscriptions, etc. As a result its focus, objectives and skills-set have been 
shaped and informed by trends within this environment (WFR9, interview, 12 
June 2010). Therefore WASPA membership would not be of much value to a 
business-to-business aggregator selling primarily marketing solutions to its 
clients. “We follow the law and not the WASPA Code of Conduct”, he says 
(WFR9, interview, 12 June 2010).  
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WASPA has therefore erroneously grouped all the firms involved in messaging 
via the mobile network into a single regulatory regime. The suggestion is that a 
separate regulatory scheme is required to meet the specific requirements of 
business-to-business aggregators. Such a regulatory scheme would not focus as 
much on consumer protection issues – but rather on industry standards setting 
and vetting members against these (WFR10, interview, 12 June 2010). The 
assumption here is that corporate brands would not involve themselves in 
underhanded practices similar to those of mobile content business-to-consumers 
players. They are not in the business of monetising mobile content and therefore 
have no commercial incentive to incentive to infringe on consumer rights – at 
least as they relate to the mobile content space.  The focus here should therefore 
be more on industry standards setting and vetting members against these to 
ensure that “you only have quality guys connecting to your network – who 
understand the operator, understand the handset and understands the 
consumer” (WFR10, interview, 12 June 2010).  A suggestion put forward is that 
the Mobile Marketing Association (MMA) – currently only an association, not a 
regulatory body – could be better placed to regulate the business-to-business 
aggregator industry (WFR10, interview, 12 June 2010). 
 
One interview respondent raises the potential conflict between legislation that 
deals with the WASP services and the Code as an issue. “The Consumer 
Protection Act and the Protection of Personal Information Bill have very specific 
requirements as to how one engages with a consumer and what one can do with 
a consumer‟s personal information” (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). The Code 
needs to take these requirements into account in order to avoid conflict between 
the legislation and the Code. Failure to do so will lead to WASPs questioning 
whether they should be practicing in line with the legislation or in line with the 
Code – and in that scenario the law of the land will always win. In addition, the 
National Lotteries Board Act of 1997 impacts on the use of premium rated 
services in competitions (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). According to section 
54 of the Act a promotional competition is legal, amongst other things, if taking 
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part in the competition does not increase the price paid for the goods or services 
(ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). Therefore an SMS used to enter the 
competition may not cost more than the network operator‟s standard tariff – 
which erodes any potential profit for WASPs. Similarly, the Code needs to take 
this into account to avoid conflict between the legislation.   
 
4.2.3. Stakeholder Participation 
Table 13 below is a snapshot of the interview respondents‟ views regarding 
stakeholder participation in WASPA processes. This is followed by a more 
detailed view of the results of the interviews. 
 
Table 12: Stakeholder Participation - Summary of Responses to Interview 
Questions 
Stakeholder Participation Yes No 
Un-
clear 
Does the WASPA Code apply to the entire industry (both 
WASPA members and non-members)?  
6 6 4 
Have all the players in the industry (including the small 
players), been meaningfully involve in industry Code 
development?  
7 6 3 
 
4.2.3.1. Code Coverage 
The number of interview participants who believe the WASPA Code applies to 
the entire industry is equal to those who believe it does not. The main difference 
in what informed the two views seems to be the definition of the WASP industry. 
The former group, on one hand, interprets the membership of the industry as 
limited to WASP firms and excludes the VAS services of network operators. The 
latter group, on the other hand, interprets the membership of the industry to 
include both WASP firms and the VAS services of network operators.  
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The interview participants who believe the WASPA Code applies to the entire 
industry view the role played by the network operators as central to the Code‟s 
success in this regard. According to one respondent both Vodacom and MTN 
insist, as a condition for doing business with them, that all WASPs sign up to the 
WASPA Code – Vodacom only makes Code acceptance compulsory, and MTN 
makes both WASPA membership and Code acceptance compulsory (ICTL2, 
interview, 3 July 2010). As a result, all WASPs that go through Vodacom‟s and 
MTN‟s networks – who collectively have the lion‟s share of the market-share – 
must sign-up to the WASPA Code. As mentioned elsewhere in this report, 
network operators play a central role in industry‟s value chain as they provide 
WASPs with two key services: distribution of content through the network and 
micro-payment billing. In other words without a relationship with the network 
operators it is almost impossible for a WASP to operate its business.  
 
The interview participants who don‟t believe the WASPA Code applies to the 
entire industry strongly believe that WASPA‟s mandate must be extended to 
include the network operators‟ related activities. The network operators benefit 
commercially from all WASP activities – including the ones that contravene the 
Code. According to WFR6 the network operator gets “to keep all their money 
made from ill-gotten gains”, whereas the WASPs “get nailed with a hefty fine” 
(WFR5 and WFR6, interview, 16 July 2010). WFR5 agrees, and argues that the 
operators pretend to be just a “dumb pipe” and not involved in the crime – but 
make a lot of money from the ill-gotten gains. Both argue that if network 
operators were required to forgo all revenues gained from WASP transgressions, 
then they would have an added incentive to put an end to these transgressions 
(WFR5 and WFR6, interview, 16 July 2010).  
 
In addition, the network operators have VAS services – i.e. WASP services – that 
are excluded from WASPA‟s regulation. WFR5 argues that “MTN and Vodacom 
run their own value-added services campaigns” and “currently they act with 
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impunity” (WFR5 and WFR6, interview, 16 July 2010). The examples he 
mentions are the “100 Days 100 Cars” from Vodacom and “Yellow 15 from MTN” 
– both SMS based competition campaigns. The WFR7 and WFR8 believe that 
the network operators “have no respect for WASPA” and do as they please 
(WFR7 and WFR8, interview, 13 August 2010). They are perceived as above the 
other players in the WASP community – and their VAS services are not subject 
to the same rules as everybody else. ICASA “should have come up with a 
mechanism to protect the end-user” from the network operators (WFR7 and 
WFR8, interview, 13 August 2010). However, with ICASA being a “useless 
organisation” means that the network operators continue to do as they please. 
They argue that WASPA must be accountable to ICASA – as the latter should 
have jurisdiction over the entire ICT industry (WFR7 and WFR8, interview, 13 
August 2010). 
 
4.2.3.2. CodeCom Processes and Inclusivity 
A slight majority of the interview respondents – with a numerical advantage of 
one – believe that all the players in the industry have been meaningfully involved 
in the Code development. One respondent believes that the Code revision 
processes are “open” and that “anyone can contribute” (NOR, interview, 4 June 
2010). Another respondent argues that the process of developing the Code “was 
inclusive of the big players” (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 2010). “Once the big 
players were on board all the smaller players would come on board” (ICTIA, 
interview, 14 July 2010). This was important in order for the Code to have any 
kind of power. In addition, the WR believes there is every opportunity for all 
interested parties to participate in discussions around the Code – through the 
face-to-face meetings or e-mail (interview, 2 June). “Anybody who goes to the 
meetings, responds to e-mails and participates gets included” (WFR3, interview, 
4 June 2010). However, it seems that that “the higher you are in the pecking 
order, the more included you are” (WFR3, interview, 4 June 2010).  
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Six interview participants raised concerns regarding the inclusiveness of Code 
development processes. Four participants indicated that they have never been 
part of CodeCom Code revision processes (WFR5 and WFR6, interview, 16 July 
2010; WFR7 and WFR8, interview, 13 August 2010). In addition, there is a view 
that the insufficient stakeholder participation within the WASP community comes 
from the fact that “different people have different passions; different companies 
have different priorities; and different people have limited time and resources” 
(ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010). For example, some companies have a dedicated 
resource for the WASPA Code, while in other companies the resource has to 
juggle regulatory issues with marketing and other commitments. Participation 
also depends on the business focus of the WASPs. For example, a WASP that 
focuses on subscription services will participate heavily on all matters related to 
subscription services as these matters have a direct impact on their bottom line 
(ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010). Importantly, it seems that WASPA does not have 
a forum WASPA to engage the broader public and consumers – and as a result 
they don‟t get their views heard (ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010). WASPA‟s limited 
public profile limits the extent to which members of the public are able to interact 
with it. “One of the problems is that there isn‟t a big enough awareness amongst 
the public about WASPA, what WASPA offers and if you have complaints that 
you can go to WASPA” (ICTL3, interview, 21 July 2010).  
 
According to the ICTL1, another limitation is the fact that the main method for 
members of the public to contact WASPA is an online mechanism. However, the 
people who use WASP services don‟t necessarily have access to the Web and e-
mail. As a result, there is a gap between the people who use the WASP services 
and the resources that are necessary in order to enforce their rights under the 
Code (interview, 10 June 2010).  
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4.2.4. Code Enforcement 
Table 14 below is a snapshot of the interview respondents‟ views regarding Code 
enforcement. This is followed by a more detailed view of the results of the 
interviews. 
 
Table 13: Code Enforcement - Summary of Responses to Interview 
Questions 
Code Enforcement Yes No 
Un-
clear 
Are the penalties for non-compliance proportional to the 
transgression?  
1 12 3 
Are the penalties a sufficient deterrent?  1 12 3 
Do companies benefit from complying with the WASPA 
Code (competitive advantage, financial advantages, 
industry rewards, etc)?  
4 6 6 
 
4.2.4.1. Punitive Measures 
Defaulting providers face numerous sanctions. WASPA has the powers to 
impose punitive fines, order refunds to consumers, suspend the defaulting 
WASP, withhold revenues, shut down services and expel providers from 
WASPA. According to one respondent the fines range from about a thousand 
rands to about two-hundred thousand rands (WFR6, interview, 16 July 2010). In 
addition to the fine, WASPA will require a subscriber to be refunded if a WASP 
has “fraudulently taken money out of the subscriber‟s account” (NOR, interview, 
4 June 2010). Alternatively the network operator will withhold the WASP‟s 
revenue for that particular service (NOR, interview, 4 June 2010). 
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Worryingly, twelve interview respondents don‟t believe that the penalties for non-
compliance are proportional to the transgression. Further. The same twelve 
respondents also don‟t believe that penalties are a sufficient deterrent. One 
respondent argues that fines should be employed only as warnings to the 
WASPs when they over-step the boundaries – and that if they continue to do so 
they might lose WASPA membership. This is the ultimate sanction as “there are 
certain resources they would not have access to if they lose their membership 
status” (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 2010). Other respondents agree with this 
sentiment that “the ultimate penalty would be to expel a member who continues 
to infringe the Code” (ICTL3, interview, 21 July 2010) and that repeat offenders‟ 
connections “should be terminated” (WFR5, interview, 16 July 2010).  
 
However, one of the interview respondents seemed to recall an instance where a 
WASPs connection has actually ever been switched off. A possible explanation 
for this is that there seems to be little incentive for the network operators to 
switch off offending WASPs as they make significant revenue from their 
activities. There is an argument that the operators should “be accountable in 
some way for allowing illegal activity to happen through their network, as 
opposed to just standing back” (WFR6, interview, 16 July 2010). Importantly, the 
there is a view that the WASPs who have been found to have committed fraud 
should be subject to criminal proceedings. “WASPA would have to take these 
matters to court on behalf of the consumers” (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 2010). 
Putting a WASP operator in jail would be one of the clearest messages ever sent 
to the industry (ICTL3, interview, 21 July 2010). This is currently not included in 
the WASPA regime. “A link between transgressing the Code and criminal 
proceedings is an important gap that needs to be closed” (ICTIA, interview, 14 
July 2010).  
 
Another important point raised is that the WASPA adjudicators are struggling to 
access key market intelligence to make their fines proportional to the 
transgressions. The adjudicators would not know “what the WASP‟s earnings are 
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in proportion to their fines” – making it difficult to determine the fines‟ 
appropriateness (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). “Trying to assign a value to 
transgressions is always incredibly difficult” (ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010). 
Because of bilateral non-disclosure agreements, the network operator will not 
divulge to third-parties the amount of money a WASP had made of a specific 
campaign. It is then difficult for WASPA, without the benefit of understanding the 
extent of the crime, to make the penalties an effective deterrent.   
 
Within that context, there is a view that research around whether the fines are a 
sufficient deterrent is important (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). “Adjudicators 
need a better rand and cents understanding of how the industry works” (ICTL2, 
interview, 3 July 2010). This will give them a better understanding of the impact 
of their judgments – as sometimes they give fines that are too high, and 
sometimes they give fines that are too low. Further, in cases “where there are 
campaigns that flout the rules, the offending WASP must disclose the value of 
the proceeds thereof” (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 2010). The fine then has to be in 
line with how much money they have made. In addition, there should be an 
obligation placed on the network operators that in such instances they should 
disclose the revenue figures associated with these violations – as they have sight 
of the revenues generated with such campaigns.  
 
4.2.5. Impact of the Code 
Table 15 overleaf is a snapshot of the interview respondents‟ views regarding the 
impact of the WASPA Code. This is followed by a more detailed view of the 
results of the interviews. 
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Table 14: Impact of the Code - Summary of Responses to Interview 
Questions 
Impact of the Code Yes No 
Un-
clear 
Have the objectives of the WASPA Code been achieved?  7 6 3 
Has it affected the behaviour of the WASPs?  8 4 4 
Has it affected the behaviour of consumers? 5 2 9 
Has the public reputation of the industry improved?  3 9 4 
Are there unintended or negative effects of the Code?  11 1 4 
 
4.2.5.1. WASP Behaviour 
The majority of interview respondents – with a slight numerical advantage of one 
– believe that the WASPA Code has achieved its objectives. One of the 
expressions of that success is seen in the improved behaviour of the WASPs. 
Eight interview respondents believe that the WASPA Code has had a positive 
impact on WASP behaviour generally. One respondent believes “WASPs are 
now a lot more careful about violating consumer rights” (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 
2010). Another respondent states that if the Code was not in existence, each 
WASP “would do whatever they want to do, however they want to do it, to 
whoever they want to do it” (NOR, interview, 4 June 2010). The Code therefore 
sets standards and WASPs now have rules to comply with. Another view that 
echoes this sentiment is that that spamming “is not a vicious as it used to be” and 
credits the Code for this reduction (WFR7 and WFR8, interview, 13 August 
2010).  
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4.2.5.2. Reputation of WASP Services 
Worryingly, six of the interview respondents don‟t believe that the WASPA Code 
has achieved its objectives. One of the expressions of this failure is that the 
reputation of the WASP industry has not improved – despite the introduction of 
the WASPA Code. Nine interview respondents don‟t believe that the public 
reputation of the industry has improved. One respondent‟s view is that “the 
network operators don‟t trust WASPs” and “members of the public don‟t trust 
subscription services – even if the services are above board” (WFR1, interview, 1 
June 2010). A similar view is that the public reputation is not improving “largely 
because the network operators themselves are not very transparent in their costs 
structures” (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 2010). Therefore, until the network 
operators themselves are more transparent then the WASP industry is not going 
to be seen as any more honest than the network operators. “This is a mobile 
ecosystem issue, rather than a WASPA issue” (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 2010). 
 
4.2.5.3. Unintended Consequences: The Cost of Managing the Code 
The overwhelming majority of interview participants – eleven in all – believe that 
the WASPA Code has had unintended negative consequences. The regular 
Code revisions are seen to impact negatively on the ability of the small WASPs 
to manage the Code – and therefore on their ability to compete in the 
marketplace. There seems to be too many and too frequent changes to the 
Code. According to one respondent this puts a considerable strain on the 
WASPS as they constantly have to change their products, and sometimes 
technology, to keep up to date with the Code (WR, interview, 2 June 2010). 
Another respondent argues that the frequent Code revisions make it difficult for 
WASPs to comply with it, as “it is impossible to comply with something that keeps 
changing” (WFR2, interview, 4 June 2010). Another view is that the small 
WASPs don‟t have adequate resources to constantly tweak their services to 
respond to a constantly changing Code, or can‟t afford to hire a Code compliance 
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officer (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). Perhaps more can be done to educate 
the WASPs on the interpretation of the Code as “there seems to be a lack of 
understanding of the provisions of the Code, and how the provisions of the Code 
relate to other legal requirements” (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010).  
 
There are suggestions that “the Code is used to limit competition” (WFR1, 
interview, 1 June 2010). This view alleges that the directors of the established 
WASPs – who also run the WASPA organisation – use fines as a tool to thwart 
competition from emerging WASPs. Another respondent believes the small 
WASPs are likely to transgress the Code at some point – as a result of their lack 
of resources to manage the Code (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). In addition, 
the small players don‟t have the necessary experience and expertise to defend 
themselves from complaints. “They can‟t properly represent themselves – even 
to appeal for the fine to be reduced or written off” (WFR1, interview, 1 June 
2010). As a result, it is very difficult for small players to survive the first year or 
two in business.  
 
4.3. Summary 
 
This qualitative study employs the more informal and less structured data 
collection methods – i.e. review of official records and semi-structured interviews 
The WASPA website has rich data on, amongst other things, historical 
adjudications and Code revisions. The data from the website is used mostly as a 
guide for the interview process – knowing which companies are serial Code 
transgressors helps identify interview participants with a “serial Code 
transgressor” perspective; and knowing how frequently the Code is revised 
draws attention to “the impact of frequent Code revisions” as an important 
interview discussion. The type of organisation the interview respondents work for 
seems to influence their perceptions of the WASPA organisation and the WASPA 
Code quite significantly. As a result, the selection of interview respondents was 
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informed by the researcher‟s requirement to get various views – and therefore 
interview respondents from organisations with varying roles in the industry value-
chain.  
 
The next chapter is an analysis of the research results. The analysis is structured 
around the research questions and the five pillars of the evaluation framework 
employed – i.e. institutional positioning, code relevance, stakeholder 
participation, code enforcement and impact of the code.   
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5. CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
As discussed earlier, the objective of this research study is to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the WASPA Code of Conduct as understood by the main role-
players in the wireless applications industry in South Africa – i.e. the researcher 
tries to understand their “perceptions, perspectives, and understandings” (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2005, p. 139). The “central task during the data analysis is to identify 
common themes in people‟s descriptions of their experiences” of the WASPA 
Code (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p. 140). The unearthed data is classified and 
analysed in terms of the themes from the analysis framework – which takes the 
same structure as the research sub-questions and the interview protocol.  
 
5.1. Whether the Organisation is in Good Standing 
5.1.1. Support for the Organisation and Code  
WASPA is viewed as a legitimate regulator of the WASP industry. Even the 
respondents who held negative sentiments towards WASPA still accepted and 
recognised the organisation‟s legitimacy as the official and legal regulator of the 
wireless applications industry. Importantly, its Code also enjoys wide acceptance 
from across the industry.  
 
WASPA membership stood at more than one-hundred organisations by the end 
of the period under review between 2006 and 2008 (Perlman, 2008). In addition, 
the WASPA Code is enforced on “information providers” – i.e. “any person on 
whose behalf a wireless application service provider may provide a service, and 
includes message originators” (WASPA, 2010). Importantly, two out of the three 
main mobile network operators as at 2008 make membership to the organisation 
a prerequisite to doing business with them (Perlman, 2006) – i.e. MTN and Cell 
C. There are some indications that Vodacom has “WASPs using its network for 
content distribution which are not WASPA members” (Muller, 2008). According to 
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one interview respondent “the network operators have all given the undertaking 
to WASPA that they will support them if it is necessary to switch-off any WASP” – 
and this gives the organisation considerable teeth (WR, interview, 2 June 2010). 
This support from industry leaders “may increase the possibility of success” for 
the self-regulatory regime (Lee, 2008, p. 279). In addition, interview respondent 
believes that “all the WASPs respect the Code, and sometimes maybe fear it, out 
of necessity” (WR, interview, 2 June 2010). The role that sanctions play is two-
fold: “to deter the offender (and thus encourage compliance with rules) and to 
repair or cure a breach of the rules” (Price & Verhulst, 1999, p. 38). As a result, 
the appropriate use of sanctions for non-compliance is important in ensuring an 
effective industry code of conduct (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 16).  
 
The support and acceptance of the Code has helped entrench it in the industry. 
According to one interview respondent, lot of the WASPs structure their business 
around the Code (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010) – and this “ability and 
willingness of the corporation to implement the code” is an important factor in its 
effectiveness (Bondy, 2007, p. 2). This strengthens the institutional positioning 
the self-regulatory regime within the industry.  
 
5.1.2. WASPA Organisation Captured by Established Players 
While WASPA is accepted as a legitimate and lawful regulator of the wireless 
applications industry, there are questions around the credibility with which it goes 
about its business. There are strongly held views amongst the smaller, emerging 
WASPs that WASPA has been captured by their more established counterparts.  
 
According to this view, the WASPA leadership is “conflicted” by their dual role as 
industry players and WASPA representatives – and this compromises the 
independence of their regulatory effort (WFR2 and WFR3, interview, 4 June 
2010). This lack of independence is described as “regulatory capture”, where “the 
regulators are co-opted by the regulatees and thus lose their legitimacy as 
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regulators” (Sethi, 2005, p. 81). WFR7 argues that “WASPA is a referee and a 
player at the same time” as the same people who run the rogue WASPs also run 
WASPA (interview, 13 August 2010). It would seem that this perceived lack of 
independence is a serious concern. Price and Verhulst argue that an effective 
self-regulatory regime must be “impartial” and “independent” (1999, p. 37). In 
addition, the smaller WASPs believe that WASPA is a “boys club” or “cartel” that 
is run by the big WASP firms “for the benefit of the big players” (WFR1, interview, 
1 June 2010). This implies some level of collusion amongst the bigger players – 
which is not uncommon in self-regulatory regimes (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 8). 
 
5.1.3. WASPA Resources  
WASPA‟s resourcing revolves around two inter-related issues: financial 
resourcing and organizational capacity.  
 
WASPA‟s self-regulation enforcement is partially funded by the three mobile 
network operators in the market as at 2008 – Vodacom, MTN and Cell C 
(Perlman, 2006). In addition, the WASPA membership fees pay for the 
organisation‟s day-to-day activities of industry promotion (Perlman, 2006). Fines 
paid by Code-contravening WASPs are another source of funding. There is a 
strong view from the interview participants that WASPA is adequately financially 
resourced (NOP, interview, 4 June 2010; WFR1, interview, 1 June 2010; WFR2 
and WFR3, interview, 4 June 2010). Harker and Harker recognise the importance 
of adequate funding, and contend that it strengthens a regulator‟s effectiveness 
(2000, p. 158). This resourcing is therefore invaluable in enhancing WASPA‟s 
ability to carry-out its duties. 
 
The issues that were raised around organizational capacity included the types of 
skills available, their level of motivation and amount of the skilled personnel 
available. Melody refers to the ability to “acquire specialised skills” as important 
to a regulator‟s effectiveness (1997, p. 19). One interview respondent believes 
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WASPA has “people with the right expertise” on board – both from a technical 
and legal perspective (NOP, interview, 4 June 2010). In addition, another 
interview respondent states that WASPA has – in its well-motivated team of 
adjudicators – more than sufficient capacity to deal with its cases (ICTL1, 
interview, 10 June 2010). Price and Verhulst appreciate the value of a well-
resourced adjudication facility, and argue that institutional capability depends on 
the self-regulatory organisation being “equipped with the necessary powers to 
evaluate any complaint” (1999, p. 37). Importantly Leon Perlman, the current 
WASPA chairman, stood out as an important driving force behind the 
organisation – and seems to command considerable respect in the industry 
(WFR5, interview, 16 July).  
 
However, the WASPA Monitor is one area that was raised repeatedly by the 
dissenting view that WASPA is not adequately resourced. Monitoring is 
especially important in the case of advertising standards, where a monitoring tool 
“covering advertising in all media should be in place in order to generate 
complaints about advertising which may be potentially unacceptable to society” 
(Harker, 2000, p. 199). The WASPA Monitor is seen as perhaps thinly resourced 
to monitor what is going on out there in the market – and as a result has become 
reactive and mostly acts as a response to complaints (ICT Industry Analyst, 
interview, 14 July). Lee stresses the importance of this function and argues 
“monitoring compliance by public authorities is believed to enhance industry 
members' adherence to self-regulation” (Lee, 2003, p. 280).  
 
5.2. Responding to the Market’s Needs 
5.2.1. Code Relevance 
“Code relevance” refers to the degree to which the Code responds to the needs 
of the stakeholders in the marketplace. All the interview respondents – bar two 
whose company is not a member of WASPA – agree that the WASPA Code‟s 
objectives are relevant and that it seeks to address crucial industry problems. 
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According to one respondent the aim of “protecting the industry from itself, 
protecting it from the risk takers and the troublemakers” – as well as protecting 
the general public – is still valid (ICTL2, interview, 3 July 2010). However, there is 
a compelling argument that the Code‟s relevance is falling short on two fronts: 
responding to the requirements of the business-to-business aggregators and 
evolving with the relevant legislation.  
 
The organisation‟s focus, objectives and skills-set have been shaped and 
informed by trends within the business-to-consumer environment. Lee argues 
that “industry members tend to comply with self-regulation guidelines, if the 
guidelines are articulated with industry expertise” (2008, p. 279). In this instance, 
a different type of expertise is required to regulate the business-to-business 
players. The business-to-business regulatory effort should not focus as much on 
consumer protection issues – but rather on industry standards setting and vetting 
members against these to ensure that “you only have quality guys connecting to 
your network – who understand the operator, understand the handset and 
understands the consumer” (WFR9 and WFR10, interview, 12 June 2010).  
 
The WASPA Code must be aligned to pertinent legislation that has a big impact 
on the industry. One respondent raises the potential conflict between, on one 
hand, the Consumer Protection Act, the National Lotteries Board Act and the 
Protection of Personal Information Bill and on the other, the WASPA Code 
(ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). For example, according to section 54 of the 
National Lotteries Board Act of 1997 a promotional competition is legal, amongst 
other things, if taking part in the competition does not increase the price paid for 
the goods or services (RSA, 1997, Section 54). Therefore an SMS used to enter 
the competition may not cost more than the network operator‟s standard tariff – 
which erodes any potential profit for WASPs. The Code needs to take this into 
account to avoid conflict between the legislation.  
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5.3. How Far the Reach Extends 
5.3.1. Organisations Included 
As a result of the WASPs dependency on the mobile network operator – for the 
delivery and billing of services – the operator controls the WASPs‟ access to the 
market. Through this power, the operator has the ability to ensure wide industry 
coverage for either WASPA membership or its Code – i.e. by making either one, 
or both, a prerequisite for the access of its network by any WASP. Without 
significant Code coverage regulation “is unlikely to be judged a viable regulatory 
effort” (Purchase, 2004. P. 83). Importantly, MTN and Cell C make WASPA 
membership to the organisation – and therefore the WASPA Code as well – a 
prerequisite to doing business with them. There are suggestions that Vodacom 
only makes signing-up to the Code compulsory. This would imply that the 
WASPA Code has complete coverage of all WASPs. In addition and as stated 
earlier, the WASPA Code is enforced on “information providers” (WASPA, 2010). 
  
Importantly, a number of interview participants strongly believe that WASPA‟s 
mandate must be extended to include the network operators‟ related activities. 
The network operators benefit commercially from all WASP activities – including 
the ones that contravene the Code. The argument is that if network operators 
were required to forgo all revenues gained from WASP transgressions, then they 
would have an added incentive to put an end to these transgressions (WFR5 and 
WFR6, interview, 16 July 2010). There are suggestions that the network 
operators “currently they act with impunity” in how they run their VAS services – 
which compete directly with WASP services (WASP Representative 6, interview, 
16 July 2010).  The “absence of the bigger companies” from Code coverage is 
seen as a significant drawback as it can limit the success of the self-regulation 
regime (Lee, 2008, p. 279).  
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5.4. Code’s Openness and Transparency 
5.4.1. CodeCom Processes and Inclusivity 
There seems to be two main schools of thought regarding WASPA‟s CodeCom 
processes – those who believe the processes are generally inclusive, and those 
who think otherwise. 
 
According to WASPA, membership to the CodeCom is open to any individual or 
entity that wishes to join. The important discussions around Code revisions take 
place during the quarterly Code review workshops and subsequent e-mail 
discussion forums – and, according to one interview participant, there is every 
opportunity for all interested parties to participate in these CodeCom discussions 
around the Code (WR, interview, 2 June). “Anybody who goes to the meetings, 
responds to e-mails and participates gets included,” the WFR3 says (WFR2 and 
WFR3, interview, 4 June 2010). Stakeholder participation contributes invaluably 
to a code‟s viability – the wider the participation the more effective it is likely to be 
(Purchase, 2004, p. 83). Conversely, a “low level of industry participation” may 
render the self-regulatory effort ineffective (Lee, 2008, p. 279). WASPA has a 
very thorough Code change and ratification process. The process includes, 
amongst others, the submission of proposed changes to the Secretariat; 
CodeCom meeting to review the proposed changes; e-mail circulation of revised 
Code version to CodeCom members and submission of the members‟ comments 
thereof; ManCom comments on the revised version; CodeCom final comments; 
and ManCom final comments and ratification of all or some of the Code changes 
(WASPA, n. d.a.). Eleven versions of WASPA Code of Conduct were published 
between 2006 and 2008 (WASPA, n.d.b.).  
 
However, there are dissenting views that the CodeCom processes are not 
inclusive – for a number of reasons. Firstly, while WFR3 believes the CodeCom 
processes are broadly inclusive of all stakeholders, there is a concern that “the 
higher you are in the pecking order, the more included you are” (WFR2 and 
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WFR3, interview, 4 June 2010). Another interview respondent believes that the 
bigger companies are seen to have relatively more influence in WASPA 
processes (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 2010). This hierarchical “pecking order” 
approach may lead to those who are affected by the Code excluded from its 
decision-making processes – raising the likelihood for hostility (Purchase, 2004, 
p. 83). Secondly, according to another interview respondent, any given 
company‟s participation is based on its priorities and resources (ICTL2, interview, 
3 July 2010). The reality is that in many companies a single resource “has to 
juggle regulatory issues with marketing and other commitments”; and companies 
whose business focus is subscription services participate considerably more on 
subscription-related discussions – to the exclusion of other discussions (ICTL2, 
interview, 3 July 2010).  
 
5.4.2. External Participation 
According to one interview respondent there is no forum for WASPA to engage 
the broader public and consumers – and as a result they don‟t get their views 
heard (ICTL2interview, 3 July 2010). Self-regulation processes potentially have 
limited external participation (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 8). External participation 
also includes members of the public and consumers – i.e. the beneficiaries of the 
Code. Price and Verhulst argue that “without user involvement, a self-regulatory 
mechanism will not accurately reflect user needs and will not be effective in 
delivering the standards it promotes” (1999, p. 15). Another interview respondent 
believes that WASPA‟s poor public profile limits the extent to which members of 
the public are able to interact with the Code (ICTL3, interview, 21 July 2010). To 
this end, regulatory institutions must be proactive in generating publicity for the 
Code (Harker and Harker, 2000, p. 158), so that they are able to use it for their 
benefit (Reding, 2007, p. 5). In addition, a third interview respondent believes 
another limitation is the fact that the main method for members of the public to 
contact WASPA is an online mechanism – resulting in a gap between the people 
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who use the WASP services and the resources that are necessary in order to 
enforce their rights under the Code (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010).  
 
However, the statistics paint a different picture – where the public is the leading 
source of complaints. In 2006 the sources of complaints lodged were split in half 
between members of the public and WASP competitors. In 2007 the public was 
the leading source of complaints at forty-seven percent and WASP competitors 
at thirty-four percent. In 2008, WASPA‟s contribution rose sharply to thirty-one 
percent and the public‟s role grew marginally to fifty-six percent – while 
complaints lodged by WASP competitors declined sharply to twelve percent.  
 
5.5. Ensuring Code Compliance 
5.5.1. Punitive Measures 
The appropriate use of sanctions for non-compliance is important in ensuring an 
effective industry code of conduct (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 16). There are 
various options within the arsenal of sanctions that self-regulatory regimes can 
use – including public disclosure, expulsion and financial penalties. WASPA has 
the powers to impose punitive fines, order refunds to consumers, suspend the 
defaulting WASP, withhold revenues, shut down services and expel providers 
from WASPA. The role that sanctions play is two-fold: “to deter the offender (and 
thus encourage compliance with rules) and to repair or cure a breach of the 
rules” (Price & Verhulst, 1999, p. 38). The use of fines is the most widely used 
part of WASPA‟s arsenal of sanctions. The number of fines greater than R100 
000 was constant for both 2006 and 2008 – at only one in each year. The 
number increased sharply to six in 2008. The trend of sharp increases in 2008 is 
consistent across all categories of fines. This is also reflected in the 
corresponding increase in the average value if fines – from R11 379 in 2007 to 
R33 163 in 2008. 
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5.5.2. Heavier Penalties 
One interview respondent argues that fines should be employed only as 
warnings to the WASPs when they over-step the boundaries – and that if they 
continue to do so they might lose WASPA membership (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 
2010). Another respondent agrees that “the ultimate penalty would be to expel a 
member who continues to infringe the Code” (ICTL3, interview, 21 July 2010). 
The challenge with enforcement in self-regulation is that punishment for 
transgressions is “limited to reputation or organisational sanctions such as the 
withdrawal of already granted seals of approval, fines, public reprimands or 
expulsion of members (Latzer, et al., 2003, p. 141). The self-regulatory body 
typically does not have the authority to “sanction existentially, by professional 
disbarment for example” (Latzer, et al., 2003, p. 141). The sanctions could 
therefore potentially be inadequate.   
 
There is a strong argument that “the absence of genuinely dissuasive and 
punitive sanctions is seen as a major weakness in a code” (Price & Verhulst, 
1999, p. 37). The ICTIA argues that WASPs who have been found to have 
committed fraud should be subject to criminal proceedings (interview, 14 July 
2010). The ICTL3 agrees and argues that where there has been fraudulent 
activity, WASPA should lay the criminal charges on behalf of the consumers 
(interview, 21 July 2010). 
 
5.5.3. Disclosure of “Crime” Proceeds 
As mentioned earlier, self-regulation is meant to lower the cost of accessing the 
expertise and technical knowledge that industry practitioners have (Baldwin & 
Cave, 1999, p. 27). As a result, it is easier to develop appropriate rules, and this 
increases the probability of the effectiveness of and compliance to the 
regulations (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 7).  
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However, the WASPA adjudicators are struggling to access a key component of 
the industry expertise and technical knowledge. According to one interview 
respondent the major challenge facing the adjudicators is that they would not 
know “what the WASP‟s earnings are in proportion to their fines” – making it 
difficult to determine the fines‟ appropriateness (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). 
Because of bilateral non-disclosure agreements, the network operator will not 
divulge to third-parties the amount of money a WASP had made of a specific 
campaign. It is then difficult for WASPA, without the benefit of understanding the 
extent of the crime, to make the penalties an effective deterrent.   
 
5.6. Achieving the Code’s Objectives  
5.6.1. WASP Behaviour 
The “impact of the Code” in part refers to whether the Code has achieved its 
intended objectives. The “reputation or organisational sanctions” for Code 
transgressions are potentially inadequate (Latzer, et al., 2003, p. 141) and not 
forceful enough (Bartle & Vass, 2005, p. 8) – resulting in the Code not achieving 
its objectives. Industry Canada argues that the “key evaluation criteria are 
results-based indicators that provide information about the achievement of 
objectives” (2002, p. 16).  
 
The number of “complaints upheld” rose from sixty-two in 2007 to one hundred 
and forty-four in 2008 – which suggests the WASP behaviour is not improving. In 
2008 the biggest areas of concern were subscription services, advertising, spam 
and competitions. The most notorious serial offenders are also some of the 
biggest WASPs in the market. In 2005, forty-nine percent of Vodacom WASP 
revenue came from the top five providers: iTouch, Exactmobile, First National 
Bank, Cointel and Foneworx. It is highly probable that these ratios would be 
duplicated in relation to MTN and Cell C (Competition Tribunal Republic of South 
Africa, 2006, p. 2). Exactmobile, Cointel/ Vodacom and iTouch/ Buongiorno are 
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also the in the top six transgressors of the WASPA Code for the period 2006 to 
2008.  
 
The statistics above paint a picture of WASP behaviour not improving – with the 
market leaders the primary transgressors. However – almost in contradiction – 
many of the interview participants believe that the Code has had a positive 
impact on WASP behaviour generally. One interview respondent argues that 
“WASPs are now a lot more careful about violating consumer rights” (ICTIA, 
interview, 14 July 2010). Another respondent agrees, and states that if the Code 
was not in existence, each WASP “would do whatever they want to do, however 
they want to do it, to whoever they want to do it” (NOR, interview, 4 June 2010). 
The Code therefore sets standards and WASPs now have rules to comply with. 
WFR7 and WFR8 believe the Code has had a positive impact on the industry 
(WFR7 and WFR8, interview, 13 August 2010). As an example, WFR7 says that 
spamming “is not a vicious as it used to be” and credits the Code for this 
reduction (WFR7 and WFR8, interview, 13 August 2010).  
 
5.6.2. Reputation of WASP Services 
One of the important objectives of Codes is to “gain consumer confidence and 
trust” (Purchase 2004, p. 81) – amongst other stakeholders. However, this 
change in behaviour discussed above has not translated into an improvement in 
the reputation of the industry. WFR1 believes “the network operators don‟t trust 
WASPs. Members of the public don‟t trust subscription services – even if the 
services are above board,” she says (interview, 1 June 2010). The ICTIA agrees 
that the public reputation is not improving. “This is largely because the network 
operators themselves are not very transparent in their costs structures,” he says 
(interview, 14 July 2010). Therefore, until the network operators themselves are 
more transparent then the WASP industry is not going to be seen as any more 
honest than the network operators. “This is a mobile ecosystem issue, rather 
than a WASPA issue” he says (ICTIA, interview, 14 July 2010). 
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5.7. Unintended Consequences 
5.7.1. The Cost of Managing the Code 
The ability to “accommodate gradual change” is an important variable in Code 
effectiveness (Purchase, 2004. P. 91). “Shifts in tastes, technologies and the 
numbers of buyers or sellers and/or their sophistication can make rules obsolete 
and in need of elimination or redrafting,” he says (Purchase, 2004. P. 91).  
However, regular Code updates impact negatively on the ability of the small 
WASPs to manage the Code – and therefore on their ability to compete in the 
marketplace. According to one interview respondents there are too many and too 
frequent changes to the Code – which results in constant changes to their 
businesses to keep up to date with the Code (WR, interview, 2 June 2010).  
There have been eleven versions of WASPA Code of Conduct in force during the 
period under review – i.e. 2006-2008 (WASPA, n.d.b.). The terms of the various 
Code versions range between one and seven months long.  
 
The “ability and willingness of the corporation to implement the code” is an 
important factor in the effectiveness of a code of conduct (Bondy, 2007, p. 2). 
Worryingly, WFR2 believes that the frequent Code revisions make it difficult for 
WASPs to comply with it. “It is impossible to comply with something that keeps 
changing,” she says (interview, 4 June 2010). In addition – according to ICTL1 – 
the small WASPs don‟t have adequate resources to constantly tweak their 
services to respond to a constantly changing Code, or can‟t afford to hire a Code 
compliance officer (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010).  She believes more can be 
done to educate the WASPs on the interpretation of the Code as “there seems to 
be a lack of understanding of the provisions of the Code, and how the provisions 
of the Code relate to other legal requirements” (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010).  
 
One of the disadvantages of self-regulation efforts is that they may lead to 
collusion and other expressions of anti-competitive behaviour (Bartle & Vass, 
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2005, p. 8).  This has led to suggestions that “the Code is used to limit 
competition” (WFR1, interview, 1 June 2010). There are suggestions that the big 
WASP directors – who also run WASPA – use fines as a tool to thwart 
competition from emerging WASPs. Another interview respondent believes the 
small WASPs are likely to transgress the Code at some point – as a result of 
their lack of resources to manage the Code (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010). In 
addition, the WFR1 believes small players don‟t have the necessary experience 
and expertise to defend themselves from complaints. “They can‟t properly 
represent themselves – even to appeal for the fine to be reduced or written off,” 
she says (interview, 1 June 2010). As a result, there are suggestions that it is 
very difficult for small players to survive the first year or two in business.  
 
5.8. Summary  
 
The data unearthed from the research study is classified and analysed in terms 
of the themes from the analysis framework – which takes the same structure as 
the research sub-questions and the interview protocol. Some of the more 
important themes from the analysis include, amongst others, the following: 
WASPA‟s alleged capture by the established players in the industry; the alleged 
insufficient Code focus on aggregators; the need for the Code to evolve with the 
changing legislative environment; the proposal to cover the network operators‟ 
VAS services in the WASPA regulatory regime; and the requirement for network 
operators to disclose the value of Code transgression proceeds.  
 
The next chapter is the report‟s conclusion. Its objective is to pull together all the 
themes from the analysis to create a singular picture of the effectiveness of the 
WASPA Code. 
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6. CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
As discussed earlier, the research question for this research study is: How 
effective has the WASPA Code of Conduct been in regulating the behaviour of 
the Wireless Application Service Providers in South Africa?  
 
In addition, the main research question has numerous sub-questions. These sub-
questions are structured to mirror the five themes around which the analytical 
framework is structured. These are: 
 
 Institutional Positioning: Is WASPA well established? 
 Code Relevance: Does the WASPA Code address a fundamental problem or 
an actual need? 
 Has the WASPA Code achieved wide coverage? 
 Stakeholder Participation: Has the WASPA Code development been open, 
transparent, fair and meaningful? 
 Stakeholder Participation: Is there a range of appropriate negative 
consequences and incentives for compliance with the WASPA Code? 
 Impact of the Code: Have the objectives of the WASPA Code been achieved? 
 Impact of the Code: Are there unintended or negative effects of the WASPA 
Code? 
 
The answers to the research question and sub-questions – as framed by the 
themes discussed above – are detailed below.  
 
In addition, the researcher tables a number of recommendations on improving 
the effectiveness of the WASPA Code.   
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6.1. Answering the Research Questions 
6.1.1. Institutional Positioning: WASPA’s Standing 
WASPA is viewed as a legitimate regulator of the WASP industry – and its Code 
enjoys wide support from the industry. 
 
However, there are some questions around WASPA‟s credibility – with 
suggestions that it has been captured by the established firms in the industry. 
There is a strongly held view that WASPA‟s mandate must be extended to 
include the network operators‟ related activities – in order to cover the entire 
industry.  
 
WASPA is generally seen to be adequately resourced to carry out its adjudication 
functions. However, the WASPA Monitor is seen to be too thinly resourced to 
effectively monitor the market activity – and as a result WASPA has become 
reactive than proactive. 
 
6.1.1.1. Recommendation: Co-Regulation 
 Self-regulation processes potentially have limited external participation (Bartle & 
Vass, 2005, p. 8) and are often seen as lacking in accountability as there is 
“insufficient participation of democratically elected parliaments” (Latzer, et al., 
2003, p. 146)., p. 5).Co-regulation is “self-regulation with public oversight or 
ratified by the state, in other words it is self-regulation with a legal basis” (Latzer, 
et al., 2003, p. 135).  
 
The WASPA regulatory regime must include some form of State participation and 
evolve to co-regulation in order to liberate itself from the clutches of industry 
capture and have the necessary clout to regulate the network operators‟ VAS 
services – both recurring themes in the research study. This State participation 
would most likely come in the form of the Independent Communications Authority 
of South Africa (ICASA). A potential model in the global context is PhonepayPlus, 
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which acts, on Ofcom‟s behalf, as the regulatory agency for premium rate 
services in the UK (PhonepayPlus, 2009, p. 4). PhonepayPlus is a co-regulatory 
scheme as its activities have a statutory basis through the UK Communications 
Act and enforced by the converged regulator Ofcom – which has the power to set 
conditions for service provision and the approval of a code regulating the 
premium rate services (Goggin, 2007, p. 147).  
 
6.1.2. Code Relevance: Response to Market Needs 
WASPA Code‟s objectives are generally viewed as relevant and addressing 
crucial industry problems. The Code has a good framework in place that deals 
with the main themes – i.e. spam, subscription services, advertising conduct and 
adult service – and constantly updated provisions within these broad themes to 
respond to changes in the environment. However, there are strong views that the 
Code can be better aligned to pertinent legislation to improve its relevance to the 
market. Further, WASPA‟s focus, objectives and skills-set have been shaped and 
informed by trends within the business-to-consumers market – and as a result is 
not able to respond sufficiently to the requirements of the business-to-business 
aggregators.  
 
6.1.2.1. Recommendation: Align Code with Legislation 
According to Purchase, the ability to “accommodate gradual change” is an 
important variable in Code effectiveness (2004. P. 91). To this end, an effective 
Code needs to be updated regularly to reflect these changing conditions 
(Industry Canada, 2002, p. 15). New legislation forms part of these changing 
conditions – as in many cases, there is reciprocal reinforcement between the law 
and codes of conduct. A weak legal instrument may be partly bolstered by using 
a voluntary approach, and vice-versa (Webb and Morrison, 2004, p. 102).  To 
this end, the WASPA Code must be aligned to pertinent legislation that has a big 
impact on the industry. These include, amongst others, the National Lotteries 
Board Act and the pending Consumer Protection Act. 
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6.1.2.2. Recommendation: Separate Regulation for Aggregators 
Lee raises the importance of industry expertise to the success of a code, and 
argues “industry members tend to comply with self-regulation guidelines, if the 
guidelines are articulated with industry expertise” (2008, p. 279). 
 
There is a view is that WASPA is not able to respond to the requirements of the 
business-to-business aggregators. Its focus, objectives and skills-set have been 
shaped and informed by trends within the business-to-consumer environment 
dominated by content services – like ringtones, subscriptions, etc. A separate 
regulatory scheme is required to meet the specific requirements of business-to-
business aggregators. Such a regulatory scheme would not focus as much on 
consumer protection issues – but rather on industry standards setting and vetting 
members against these.  
 
6.1.3. Stakeholder Participation: Code’s Reach 
The support of the three leading mobile network operators was highlighted as 
particularly important to ensuring wide coverage of the WASPA Code – all 
WASPs that go through Vodacom‟s and MTN‟s network must sign-up to the 
WASPA Code.  
 
6.1.3.1. Recommendation: Extend Coverage to Operators’ VAS Services 
Wide coverage contributes invaluably to a code‟s viability (Purchase, 2004, p. 
83). It is particularly important for the Code to cover the major industry players, 
as “absence of the bigger companies” can limit the success of the self-regulation 
regime (Lee, 2008, p. 279).  
 
WASPA‟s mandate must extend to the value added services from the network 
operators in order to truly have industry-wide coverage. The network operators 
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benefit commercially from all WASP activities – including the ones that 
contravene the Code. If network operators were required to forgo all revenues 
gained from WASP transgressions, then they would have an added incentive to 
put an end to these transgressions. In addition, the network operators have their 
own value added services that are excluded from WASPA‟s regulation – e.g. the 
“100 Days 100 Cars” from Vodacom and “Yellow 15” from MTN, both SMS based 
competition campaigns. The network operators are perceived as above the other 
players in the WASP community – and their VAS services are not subject to the 
same rules as everybody else. Co-regulation should provide the necessary 
muscle to effectively regulate the network operators. 
 
6.1.4. Stakeholder Participation: Openness and Transparency 
The majority view is that the Code development processes are inclusive of the 
players within the WASP community. There is every opportunity for all interested 
parties to participate in discussions around the Code. 
 
However, different companies have different resources, priorities and passions. 
There are some companies who are willing and able to spend more time on the 
Code than others. For example, some companies have a dedicated resource for 
the WASPA Code, while in other companies one resource has to juggle 
regulatory issues with marketing and other commitments. Participation also 
depends on the business focus of the WASPs. For example, a WASP that 
focuses on subscription services will participate heavily on all matters related to 
subscription services as these matters have a direct impact on their bottom line. 
 
6.1.4.1. Recommendation: Public Awareness Campaign 
External participation in Code processes also includes members of the public 
and consumers – i.e. the beneficiaries of the Code. Price and Verhulst argue that 
effective self-regulation needs the involvement of consumers and citizens 
throughout its development and implementation – and that “without user 
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involvement, a self-regulatory mechanism will not accurately reflect user needs 
and will not be effective in delivering the standards it promotes” (1999, p. 15).   
 
To this end, regulatory institutions must be proactive in generating publicity for 
the Code (Harker and Harker, 2000, p. 158), so that they are able to use it for 
their benefit (Reding, 2007, p. 5). WASPA must engage the broader public and 
consumers about the Code, their rights and redress processes and channels in 
instances when their rights have been abused. 
 
6.1.5. Code Enforcement: Ensuring Compliance 
Defaulting providers face numerous sanctions. WASPA has the powers to 
impose punitive fines, order refunds to consumers, suspend the defaulting 
WASP, withhold revenues, shut down services and expel providers from 
WASPA. The use of fines is the most widely used part of WASPA‟s arsenal of 
sanctions. However, the WASPA adjudicators are unable to access information 
on “what the WASP‟s earnings are in proportion to their fines” – making it difficult 
to determine the fines‟ appropriateness.  
 
There is a strong argument that the sanctions could be inadequate.  Fines should 
be employed only as warnings to the WASPs when they over-step the 
boundaries – with the ultimate sanctions being the rarely used expulsion from 
WASPA and having their connections with the operators switched-off. Further, 
WASPA should lay criminal charges – on the consumers‟ behalf – against those 
WASPs who have been found to have committed fraud. 
 
6.1.5.1. Recommendation: Publish Value of Transgressions 
The appropriate use of sanctions for non-compliance is important in ensuring an 
effective industry code of conduct (Industry Canada, 2002, p. 16). The role that 
sanctions play is two-fold: “to deter the offender (and thus encourage compliance 
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with rules) and to repair or cure a breach of the rules” (Price and Verhulst, 1999, 
p. 38).  
 
However, because of bilateral non-disclosure agreements, the network operator 
will not divulge to third-parties the amount of money a WASP had made of a 
specific campaign. It is then difficult for WASPA, without the benefit of 
understanding the extent of the crime, to make the penalties an effective 
deterrent. An effective way to close this information gulf is for network operators 
to provide information on the value of transgressions to the WASPA adjudicators. 
 
6.1.6. Impact of the Code: Achieving Objectives  
The rising number of “complaints upheld” paints a picture of WASP behaviour not 
improving – with the market leaders the primary transgressors. In 2008 the 
biggest areas of concern were subscription services, advertising, spam and 
competitions.  
 
However – almost in contradiction – many of the interview participants believe 
that the Code has had a positive impact on WASP behaviour generally where 
“WASPs are now a lot more careful about violating consumer rights”. This 
perceived change in behaviour has not translated into an improvement in the 
reputation of the industry and its services – as network operators and members 
of the public don‟t trust still don‟t trust WASPs and their services.  
 
6.1.6.1. Recommendation: Stronger Sanctions 
As mentioned above, sanctions are partly meant “to deter the offender (and thus 
encourage compliance with rules)” (Price and Verhulst, 1999, p. 38). However, 
there are a number of serial Code offenders – primarily the big WASPs – who 
seem undeterred by the fines against them. 
 
 Itumeleng Tumi Mokgoro 0400072N 100 
It is difficult to establish if the high number of offences by the big WASPs is 
simply a by-product of the sheer scale of their business – as in the higher 
number of services and customers in itself potentially increases the probability of 
Code transgressions – or if the offences result from an unethical approach to 
doing business. What is clear is that the illicit conduct of these big companies – 
and the resultant punitive fines – does not seem to have had a negative impact 
on the viability of their business. In other words, at least for the big players, there 
does not appear to be any commercial incentive to avoid punitive fines and 
comply with the Code. If that is indeed the case, then WASPA needs to 
implement stronger punitive measures. The best way to ensure compliance to 
the Code is to start cutting off connections – from the network operators – for 
repeat offenders. Those offenders who not only transgress the WASPA Code, 
but have also break the law of the country, must have criminal charges brought 
against them.  
 
6.1.7. Impact of the Code: Unintended Consequences 
There are too many and too frequent changes to the Code. This puts a 
considerable strain on the WASPS as they constantly have to change their 
products, and sometimes technology, to keep up to date with the Code. 
Worryingly, the small WASPs don‟t have adequate resources to constantly 
respond to a changing Code – and as a result are likely to transgress the Code at 
some point. They would not have the necessary experience and expertise to 
defend themselves from complaints. Consequently, this affects their ability to 
compete in the marketplace – and makes it very difficult for them to survive the 
first year or two in business.  
 
6.1.7.1. Recommendation: Code Education for Smaller Players 
The “impact of the Code” in part refers to whether the Code has had unintended 
negatives consequences. The “ability and willingness of the corporation to 
implement the code” is an important factor in the effectiveness of a code of 
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conduct (Bondy, 2007, p. 2). According to Purchase, “shifts in tastes, 
technologies and the numbers of buyers or sellers and/or their sophistication can 
make rules obsolete and in need of elimination or redrafting,” he says (2004. P. 
91). However, the regular updates to the WASPA Code have had negative 
consequences.  
 
The regular Code updates impact negatively on the ability of the small WASPs to 
manage the Code. WASPA can play an important role in educating the WASPs 
on the interpretation of the Code as “there seems to be a lack of understanding 
of the provisions of the Code, and how the provisions of the Code relate to other 
legal requirements” (ICTL1, interview, 10 June 2010).  
 
6.2. Summary 
 
According to WASPA Chairman, Leon Perlman, WASPA‟s central objective is 
“protecting consumers from rogue services that negatively impact consumer 
confidence and the industry,” (Rasool, 2010). The organisation employs its Code 
of Conduct as the primary instrument in achieving this high aspiration. The 
overall verdict from this research study is that the WASPA Code of Conduct has 
not been effective in regulating the behaviour of the Wireless Application Service 
Providers in South Africa.  
 
The findings from the research study suggest that the WASPA Code has more 
weaknesses than strengths. A significant finding is that WASPA is viewed as a 
legitimate regulator of the WASP industry – and its Code enjoys wide support 
from the industry. However, there are some questions around the organisation 
and the Code‟s credibility in a number of important areas. Some of the more 
important negative findings include, amongst others, the following: WASPA might 
have been captured by the established players in the industry; the WASPA Code 
seems to have insufficient focus on business-to-business aggregators; the Code 
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might enhance its relevance by evolving with the changing legislative 
environment; the WASPA regulatory regime must cover the network operators‟ 
VAS services in order to ensure more meaningful industry coverage; and the 
requirement for network operators to disclose the value of Code transgression 
proceeds to ensure better alignment between the value of transgressions and 
sanctions.  
 
The researcher has tabled numerous recommendations to enhance the 
effectiveness of the WASPA Code. One of the said recommendations relates to 
the possible inclusion of some form of State participation in WASPA to evolve its 
regime to co-regulation. The suggestion is that this will help liberate WASPA from 
the clutches of industry capture and provide it with have the necessary clout to 
regulate the network operators‟ VAS services. However, this research study 
failed to explore – in significant detail – the State participation options available. 
A possible further area of research could look into the possible forms of State 
participation in the WASPA regulatory regime. 
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9. ANNEXURES  
9.1. Interview Protocol 
 
Introduction  
The interview will be preceded by the 
following introductory remarks. 
This is an independent study  
The research is confidential and anonymous  
The purpose of this research study is to evaluate how effective the WASPA code of 
conduct has been in regulating the behaviour of the Wireless Applications Service 
Providers in South Africa.   
The full research report will be available to you. 
May I record the interview to help with note-taking? 
Demographic Information 
The following information on the 
interview participants should be 
provided. 
Name   
Job Title  
Company   
Industry   
 
   
 
Qualitative Information 
The following questions (within the 
identified themes) will guide the 
interview.  
Institutional Positioning 
 Do you consider WASPA to be a credible and legitimate organisation? 
 Do you think the WASPA Code enjoys widespread support from the players in the 
industry? 
 Does WASPA have sufficient resources and expertise to enforce the Code? 
Code Relevance 
 Are the objectives of the WASPA Code still relevant today? 
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 Comment on the processes to evaluate and revise the Code to reflect changing 
conditions. 
 How effective are the processes? 
 Are they inclusive? 
Stakeholder Participation 
 Does the WASPA Code apply to the entire industry (both WASPA members and non-
members)? 
 Have all the players in the industry (including the smaller players), been meaningfully 
involved in industry code development? 
Code Enforcement 
 Are the penalties for non-compliance proportional to the transgression? 
 In other words does the punishment fit the “crime”? 
 Are the penalties a sufficient deterrent? 
 Do companies benefit from complying with the WASPA Code (competitive advantage, 
financial advantages, industry rewards, etc)? 
Impact of the Code 
 Have the objectives of the WASPA Code been achieved? 
 What has been the impact of the Code in the sector 
 Has it affected the behaviour of the WASPs? 
 Has it affected the behaviour of consumers 
 Has the public reputation of the industry improved? Important. 
 Are there unintended or negative effects of the Code? 
 For example, does the code limit competition or innovation? 
 Does the code place different burdens on different parties in the same sector (e.g. 
smaller versus big business)? 
Source: Adapted from Industry Canada, 2002, p. 12-21 
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9.2. WASPA Complaint Report 2006-2008 
 
Year WASPA Member 
Service 
description 
Source Result Fines 
Fine 
Range 
2006 Mira Networks Content Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
1000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 AfriGIS Advertising Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
1000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Viamedia Content Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
1500 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 eXactmobile Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
2000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Strike Media Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
2000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Viamedia Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Gozomo Pricing Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
4000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Worldplay Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 iTouch Content Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 
TelePlay 
Communications 
Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Cellfind Content Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
6000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Integrat Competition Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
6000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 eXactmobile Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 eXactmobile Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Worldplay Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
8000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Cellfind Commercial Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
9400 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Clickatell 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Mira Networks Subscription Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 eXactmobile Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Vending for Africa Other Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 eXactmobile Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 
TelePlay 
Communications 
Adult Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Mira Networks Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
12500 
0 - 
20,000 
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2006 Cointel Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
13000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Cointel Pricing Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
13500 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Wireless Warriors 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 eXactmobile Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 iTouch Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 eXactmobile Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Cointel Competition Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 eXactmobile Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 iTouch Other Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
16000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 Sybase 365 Content Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
16000 
0 - 
20,000 
2006 iTouch Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
20000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2006 Viamedia Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
22500 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2006 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
24000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2006 Cointel Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2006 eXactmobile Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
40000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2006 iTouch Adult Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
45000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2006 eXactmobile Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
47500 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2006 Peach Mobile Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2006 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2006 Mira Networks Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
65000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2006 Mira Networks Dating Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
80000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2006 Buongiorno UK! Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
100000 >100,000 
2006 eXactmobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 
Grapevine 
Interactive 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2006 Cointel 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Mira Networks 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
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2006 
Always Active 
Technologies 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Starfish Mobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Integrat 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Nashua Mobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 
SMS Cellular 
Services 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Intermobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2006 Integrat 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Viamedia Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2006 Integrat Subscription Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 
Internal WASP 
Service of MTN 
Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 iTouch Subscription Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 eXactmobile Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Viamedia Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Mira Networks Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Integrat Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2006 Buongiorno UK! Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 iTouch Subscription Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Worldplay Subscription 
Advertising 
Standards 
Authority of 
South Africa 
Advisory report     
2006 Buongiorno UK! Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Mira Networks Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Viamedia Subscription Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Integrat Subscription Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
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2006 Integrat Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 
MyBeat 
Interactive 
Pricing Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Mira Networks Pricing Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Integrat 
Premium rated 
SMS 
Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Marketel Other Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Vending for Africa Other Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 eXactmobile Other Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Vending for Africa Other Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 iTouch Content Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2006 iTouch Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 eXactmobile Content Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Cointel Content Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Viamedia Content Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 
Always Active 
Technologies 
Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 eXactmobile Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Mira Networks Content Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Mira Networks Content Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 iTouch Competition Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2006 Cointel Competition Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Worldplay Communication Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 
Grapevine 
Interactive 
Commercial Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Mira Networks Commercial Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Intermobile 
Bulk 
messaging 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2006 iTouch 
Bulk 
Messaging 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Autopage Cellular Billing Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 eXactmobile Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
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2006 Mira Networks Advertising Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 
MyBeat 
Interactive 
Adult Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2006 Marketel Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2006 Marketel Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 eXactmobile Content WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
1000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 eXactmobile Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
1500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 
Internal WASP 
Service of MTN 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
2000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 eXactmobile Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
2000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 iTouch Commercial Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 iTouch Commercial Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Sybase 365 Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 eXactmobile Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Adult WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Adult WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Adult WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Autopage Cellular 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 
Internal WASP 
Service of MTN 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Sybase 365 Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 SMSNET-SA Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 iTouch Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
6000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Autopage Cellular 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Autopage Cellular 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Integrat Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 iTouch Commercial Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
8500 
0 - 
20,000 
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2007 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Autopage Cellular 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 iTouch   Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
11000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 iTouch Commercial Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
11000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Mira Networks Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Buongiorno UK! Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
17500 
0 - 
20,000 
2007 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2007 Sybase 365 Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2007 GMA Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2007 Mira Networks 
Bulk 
messaging 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
100000 >100,000 
2007 Celerity Systems 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Mira Networks 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Mira Networks 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 
Stouf 
Communications 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Nashua Mobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
  
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Nashua Mobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2007 Buongiorno UK! Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Integrat Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Zed Mobile Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Buongiorno UK! Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Sybase 365 Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Sybase 365 Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
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2007 Sybase 365 Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 eXactmobile Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Integrat Subscription WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Integrat Subscription WASPA 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2007 Sybase 365 Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Playfon Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Integrat Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Integrat Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Buongiorno UK! Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 2waytraffic Subscription Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2007 eXactmobile SMS offers WASPA 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2007 eXactmobile SMS offers WASPA 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2007 
MyBeat 
Interactive 
Pricing WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 iTouch Other Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Mira Networks 
Free SMS 
service 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Mira Networks 
Free SMS 
service 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Sam Click Content Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Clickatell Competition Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2007 Sybase 365 Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Nashua Mobile Communication Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 MIG Commercial Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 
Grapevine 
Interactive 
Commercial Public 
IP notice 
issued 
    
2007 Cellsmart Commercial Public 
IP notice 
issued 
    
2007 Autopage Cellular 
Bulk 
messaging 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Marketel 
Bulk 
messaging 
Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2007 Mira Networks 
Bulk 
messaging 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
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2007 Blinck Mobile Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Marketel Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Integrat Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Sybase 365 Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 Integrat Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2007 iTouch Advertising Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Opera Telecom Adult Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Mira Networks Adult Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2007 
TelePlay 
Communications 
Adult WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 
MyBeat 
Interactive 
Adult WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2007 Clickatell   Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2007 Sybase 365   Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2008 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
2000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 eXactmobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 iTouch Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Grapevine 
Interactive 
Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Grapevine 
Interactive 
Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 ABSA Commercial Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Marketel Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
2500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 SMSNET-SA Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
3000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
3000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Sybase 365 Service levels WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
3500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 eXactmobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Marketel 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
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2008 Marketel 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Service levels WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 iTouch Service levels WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider/Always 
Active 
Technologies 
No cost of SMS WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Opera Telecom Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Clickatell Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
5000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
7000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 eXactmobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 iTouch Advertising Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Mobile 
Messenger 
Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
7500 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Two Screens 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Subscription Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Integrat Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Buongiorno UK! Subscription WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Integrat Pricing WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 2waytraffic/Invicta Other WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
No cost of SMS WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Buongiorno UK! No cost of SMS WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
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2008 AMV 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Buongiorno UK! Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Opera Telecom Competition Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Opera Telecom Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Digital Mall Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 iTouch Adult WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
10000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Marketel Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
12000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 AMV Content WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
15000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 eXactmobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
20000 
0 - 
20,000 
2008 Buongiorno UK! Refund  Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
20000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 Endemol SA No cost of SMS WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
20000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 SMSNET-SA Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
20000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 eXactmobile Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
21000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 Opera Telecom Subscription WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
22000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 Buongiorno UK! Other WASPA 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
22500 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 AMV Subscription Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 Integrat Subscription WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 SMS Portal No cost of SMS Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 AMV Content Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 
TIMw.e. New 
Media 
Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 Sybase 365 Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
25000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 Blinck Mobile Bundling Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
30000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
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2008 Buongiorno UK! Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
30000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 IWS 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
35000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 SMSNET-SA Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
35000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 iTouch Subscription WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
35000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 Africa2You Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
35000 
20,000 - 
50,000 
2008 iTouch 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 AMV 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 Buongiorno UK! Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 Buongiorno UK! Service levels WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 eXactmobile Service levels Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 Mira Networks Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
50000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 iTouch 
Various 
breaches 
Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
52000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 Buongiorno UK! Web site Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
56000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 Clickatell Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
60000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 eXactmobile Service levels WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
65000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 Mira Networks 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
75000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 SafikaTel Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
75000 
50,000 - 
100,000 
2008 AMV 
Various 
breaches 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
100000 >100,000 
2008 AMV Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
100000 >100,000 
2008 Integrat Other WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
150000 >100,000 
2008 AMV 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
250000 >100,000 
2008 Teljoss Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
300000 >100,000 
2008 MoloAfrika Competition Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
500000 >100,000 
2008 AMV 
Various 
breaches 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 eXactmobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 Integrat 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
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2008 eXactmobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 eXactmobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Nashua Mobile 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2008 Celerity Systems 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Celerity Systems 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Autopage Cellular 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 
The NXT Thing 
Now 
Unsolicited 
Message 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Integrat 
Unlawful 
conduct 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Unlawful 
conduct 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Integrat 
Unlawful 
conduct 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Sybase 365 Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 eXactmobile Subscription Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2008 Buongiorno UK! Subscription Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 Atinco SA Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 AMV Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Mira Networks Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 SMSNET-SA Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 
TIMw.e. New 
Media 
Subscription Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Buongiorno UK! Subscription WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 SMSNET-SA Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 eXactmobile Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 SMSNET-SA Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Blinck Mobile Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Sybase 365 Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 iTouch Subscription Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
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2008 Worldplay Subscription Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Mediadeck SA Service levels Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Celerity Systems Service levels WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Buongiorno UK! Service levels WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 
Smartcall 
Technology 
Solutions 
Pricing Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Buongiorno UK! Pricing Competitor 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 
Mobile 
Messenger 
Pricing Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 SA Funclub Other Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 iTouch Other Public 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Service levels Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 AMV 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 eXactmobile 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 mBill 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Viamedia 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Buongiorno UK! 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Viamedia 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 SMSNET-SA 
Disputed 
refund 
Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Mira Networks Customer Care WASPA 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 iTouch Customer Care WASPA 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Customer Care Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Integrat Content Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 AMV Content Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
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2008 Integrat Content Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 Cellfind Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Opera Telecom Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 eXactmobile Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Celerity Systems Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Strike Media Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Opera Telecom Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Blinck Mobile Competition Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 mBill Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 mBill Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 mBill Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 mBill Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 mBill Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 mBill Competition WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 mBill Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 mBill Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 mBill Competition Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Blinck Mobile Commercial WASPA 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2008 
Grapevine 
Interactive 
Commercial Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 
Smartcall 
Technology 
Solutions 
Billing Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 
Smartcall 
Technology 
Solutions 
Billing Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 Integrat Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Sybase 365 Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 
Vodacom Service 
Provider 
Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Marketel Advertising WASPA 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 Integrat Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
 Itumeleng Tumi Mokgoro 0400072N 128 
2008 Sybase 365 Advertising WASPA 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 SMSNET-SA Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2008 Sybase 365 Advertising WASPA 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 eXactmobile Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 iTouch Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Integrat Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Viamedia Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Blinck Mobile Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Buongiorno UK! Advertising Competitor 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Integrat Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 Blinck Mobile Advertising WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 Peach Mobile Adult Public 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 
Wap Network 
Group 
Adult Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 iTouch Adult WASPA 
Complaint not 
upheld 
    
2008 Marketel Adult WASPA 
Complaint 
partially upheld 
    
2008 Autopage Cellular   WASPA 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
2008 iTouch   Public 
Complaint 
dismissed 
    
2008 AMV   Public 
Complaint 
upheld 
    
 
 
 
